Patent  Trespass  and the Royalty Gap:  Exploring the Nature and Impact of Patent Holdout by Bowman Heiden & Nicolas Petit
Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal
Volume 34 | Issue 2 Article 1
1-3-2018
Patent "Trespass" and the Royalty Gap: Exploring
the Nature and Impact of Patent Holdout
Bowman Heiden
Nicolas Petit
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara High Technology Law Journal by an authorized editor of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com, pamjadi@scu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bowman Heiden and Nicolas Petit, Patent "Trespass" and the Royalty Gap: Exploring the Nature and Impact of Patent Holdout, 34 Santa
Clara High Tech. L.J. 179 ().
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol34/iss2/1
  
	
179 
	
PATENT “TRESPASS” AND THE ROYALTY GAP: 
EXPLORING THE NATURE AND IMPACT OF PATENT 
HOLDOUT 
Bowman Heiden† & Nicolas Petit‡  
This paper studies a problem known as “patent holdout.” Part 
I reviews the literature on holdout, with a specific emphasis on patents. 
The literature shows that the ordinary concept of holdout refers to the 
non-transacting conduct of a property owner, and that “patent 
trespass” is a better characterization for technology implementers’ 
attempt to evade concluding licensing agreements with patent owners. 
Part II proposes a definition and illustrations of patent trespass, 
relying on the qualitative data collected during interviews with 
industry stakeholders as well as on an analysis of U.S. and European 
case law. Part III conceptualizes the factors that determinatively make 
patent trespass circumstantial, systematic, and/or systemic. Part IV 
records the results of a quantitative study of patent trespass, based on 
the intuitions that arose from received theory and qualitative 
interviews as exposed in previous parts. The preliminary empirical 
results show a correlation between the nature of patent trespass and 
the heterogeneity of market actors and markets. In particular, 
multinational corporations (“MNCs”) operating in developed markets 
seem to primarily deploy extensive patent trespass delay tactics with 
the main goal of reducing their royalty payments. In comparison, large 
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firms in emerging markets (“LFEs”) and small- to medium-sized 
enterprises (“SMEs”), especially the “long tail” of microvendors, seek 
to avoid payment altogether. The main conclusion of the study is that 
patent trespass is a significant phenomenon, which deserves as much 
attention from courts and policymakers as the patent holdup narrative. 
Our study recommends moving towards a new holistic framework in 
policymaking—one that grasps the asymmetric bargaining power that 
may exist between patent holders and technology implementers.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Across the world, a problem known as “patent holdup” has 
become a central issue of discussion in academic and policy circles. 
Broadly, patent holdup is said to occur when a patent owner makes 
licensing or cross-licensing demands that are more onerous than those 
anticipated by technology implementers when they decided to enter the 
industry.1 Patent holdup is often considered more severe in relation to 
a category of patents that are declared essential to the implementation 
of an industrial standard, known as standard essential patents (“SEPs”). 
SEPs are limitedly open to design around. Hence, when technology 
implementers have made early sunk investments in a standardized 
technology, they are locked in with no other choice but to acquire a 
license to practice the standard. With this, patent owners are essentially 
able to extract ex post royalties in excess of what they anticipated ex 
ante had the patented technology that they declared essential not been 
selected for inclusion in the standard. 
Concerns of patent holdup have informed much of the debate 
regarding patent and antitrust reform for the past decade, particularly 
in industries that produce multi-technology products, such as wireless 
communications.2 In those industries, SEPs are pervasive. As the story 
goes, if patent holdup is systematic, SEP owners unconstrained by each 
other’s licensing policies collectively impose a “royalty stack” on 
downstream industries, and eventually on consumers.3 This, in turn, 
wields a systemic effect on investment incentives and innovation by 
complementary innovators.4 
																																								 																				
 1. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX.  L. 
REV. 1991, 1992-93 (2007). 
 2. Hon. Maureen K. Ohlhausen, The Elusive Role of Competition in the Standard-Setting 
Antitrust Debate, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93, 123-24 (2017). 
 3. Carl Shapiro, Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties, 12 AM. L. ECON. REV. 280, 
286 (2010). 
 4. Roger Brooks, Patent “Hold-Up,” Standards-Setting Organizations And The FTC’s 
Campaign Against Innovators 39 AIPLA Q. J. 435, 458-59 (2011) (discussing a FTC report that 
talked of a “systemic problem of patent hold-up”); Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup 
and Royalty Stacking – A Reply, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2163, 2167 (2007) (“Because holdup 
discourages investments and innovation by users, and reduces the return to complementary 
innovators generally, there are very strong reasons to believe that patent holdup discourages 
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In contrast, patent holdout (also known as “reverse holdup,”5 
“licensee holdup,”6 and “efficient infringement”7) has featured less 
prominently on research and policy agendas.8 Patent holdout is today 
understood as the conduct of patented-technology implementers who 
deliberately choose to avoid concluding a licensing agreement, in the 
hopes of paying either zero or reduced royalties.9 Admittedly, interest 
towards patent holdout should increase with the introduction of legal 
doctrines and regulatory policies that curtail the enforcement of 
SEPs—including, in some cases, setting aside the availability of 
injunctive relief as a remedy.10  
Our study seeks to fill this space. Its primary ambition is to 
dissipate the definitional uncertainty surrounding patent holdout. To 
that end, we review the meaning of holdout in mainstream economics. 
This inquiry leads us to an unexpected discovery: holdout is a term of 
art that invariably defines the conduct of a property owner—not the 
conduct of technology implementers. On this basis, we open a 
discussion on the possible policy impact that the choice of a concept 
like “holdup” had on policy makers, as opposed to holdout. 
Once this is done, we turn to an empirical discussion that 
addresses the strategies of technology implementers that practice a 
patent without a license. We substitute the improper concept of patent 
holdout with the concept of “patent trespass,” and look at existing 
																																								 																				
innovation.”). 
 5. Damien Geradin, Reverse Hold-ups: The (Often Ignored) Risks Faced by Innovators 
in Standardized Area, in PROS AND CONS OF STANDARD SETTING 101, 118 (Konkurrensverket 
ed., 2010).  
 6. F. Scott Kieff & Anne Layne-Farrar, Incentive Effects from Different Approaches to 
Holdup Mitigation Surrounding Patent Remedies and Standard-Setting Organizations, 9 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1091, 1103 (2013).  
 7. Michael Renaud, James Wordarwski, & Sandra Badin, Efficient Infringement and the 
Undervaluation of Standard-Essential Patents, INTELL. ASSET MGMT., Sept.-Oct. 2016, at 59. 
 8. Id. at 60 (noting that the U.S. courts “seem to be much more concerned with patent 
hold-up than they are with patent hold-out”). More generally, as of August 2, 2017, searching for 
variants of the concept of “patent holdout” yielded the following results: “Reverse holdup,” 95 
results; “reverse hold-up,” 152 results; “patent holdout,” 38 results; and “patent hold-out,” 27 
results. This can be contrasted with the results for variants of patent holdup: “Patent holdup,” 
1820 results; and “Patent hold-up,” 985 results. 
 9. Yann Ménière, Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) Licensing Terms 
– Research Analysis of a Controversial Concept, JOINT RES. CTR. 15 (2015), 
http://bit.do/FRAND_JRC (“Knowing this, some implementers may commit ‘hold out’ or 
‘reverse hold-up’ not only by using essential technology without a license but also by deliberately 
choosing not to seek a license. If this happens, patent ‘hold out’ can induce royalty losses for SEP 
holders, and significantly reduce their incentives to invest in the development of standards. 
Typically, hold-out practices are combined with the challenge of validity and essentiality of SEPs 
in front of a court.”). 
 10. Colleen Chien, Holding Up and Holding Out, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 
1, 17 (2014). 
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instantiations. In this largely “undertheorized” field,11 we seek 
observable conduct features that can serve as proxies to characterize 
patent trespass. 
Our last goal is more theoretical. We try to understand if, in a 
similar way as with patent holdup, certain factors transform 
circumstantial occurrences of patent trespass into a systematic or 
systemic issue.12 Generally, systematic effects are said to occur 
because SEP users face a royalty stack, and systemic effects are 
anticipated through reduced investment incentives by manufacturers of 
complementary technologies. As a mirror reflection of this, we say that 
trespass is systematic when an SEP owner faces a “royalty gap”—i.e., 
referring to the unlicensed segment of the market—and that systemic 
trespass occurs when there are adverse effects on the investment 
incentives of developers of enabling technologies.13 With this 
background, we try to identify the factors that determine the occurrence 
of circumstantial, systematic, and systemic patent trespass. At this 
stage, our aim is not to conclusively verify if patent trespass is 
systematic or systemic. Instead, we modestly attempt to grasp the 
features that may lead to such outcomes and provide initial empirical 
evidence. As part of this assessment, we try to understand whether 
evolutions in the legal environment have created inflexion points in 
patent licensing discussions. 
Our study is based in part on a cross-sectional investigation. 
Throughout 2016 and 2017, we conducted qualitative interviews with 
five industry stakeholders on both sides of the patent spectrum, namely 
SEP holders and SEP implementers. In addition, we organized a 
structured survey with twelve experienced SEP licensing experts to 
elicit early quantitative measures based on our review of the applicable 
theory and the qualitative interviews. Considering the data collected, 
we then attempt to separate the wheat of legitimate SEP licensing 
negotiations from the chaff of patent trespass strategies.  
This paper is structured as follows: In Part I, we review the 
economic theory of holdout with a specific emphasis on patents. We 
show that the ordinary concept of holdout refers to the non-transacting 
conduct of a property owner, and that “patent trespass” is a better 
characterization for technology implementers’ attempts to evade 
concluding licensing agreements. In Part II, we propose a definition 
																																								 																				
 11. Id. at 20. 
 12. By circumstantial, we mean one-off, particular, or specific instances of patent trespass. 
This terminology is borrowed from Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 
451, 497-98 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 13. Bernhard Ganglmair, Luke Froeb, & Gregory Werden, Patent Hold-Up and Antitrust: 
How A Well-Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation, 60 J. INDUS. ECON. 249, 254-55 (2012). 
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and provide illustrations of patent trespass. For this, we rely on the 
qualitative data gathered during interviews with industry stakeholders 
as well as on an analysis of holdout in case law. In Part III, we expose 
the factors that determinatively make patent trespass circumstantial, 
systematic and/or systemic. In Part IV, we report on the results of our 
quantitative analysis. 
I. PATENT HOLDOUT THEORY 
A.  Holdout in Mainstream Economics 
In mainstream economics, holdout is a term of art used to denote 
the situation that arises when an economic agent cannot act “unless 
there is first the consent of some determinate group of individuals.”14 
For instance, “B has a holdout position simply by virtue of the fact that 
A cannot undertake some desired action without her consent.”15 In 
essence holdout means that coordination between economic agents 
does not occur. 
In mainstream economics, holdout belongs to the wider category 
of situations of failed coordination and collective action problems 
amongst economic agents.16 Holdout is often compared, and 
contrasted, with the concept of externalities, which occur when B 
undertakes some desired action without taking into account the effects 
of its decisions on A.17 Holdout is also discussed, and distinguished, 
from free-riding (or freeloading). In free-riding, A provides an 
imperfectly excludable good, and B can enjoy its benefits without 
contributing to the cost of provision.18  
Several real-life applications of holdout feature prominently in the 
economic literature. Consider, for example, common pool problems 
such as oil field unitization.19 Competition amongst oil production 
																																								 																				
 14. Richard Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More Salute to 
Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & ECON. 553, 559 (1993). Some studies oversee the fact that hold-out is a 
well-known phenomenon in economics. See Chryssoula Pentheroudakis & Justus Baron, 
Licensing Terms of Standard Essential Patents – A Comprehensive Analysis of Cases, JOINT RES. 
CTR. 26 (2017), http://bit.do/LicensingTerms_JRC (“Unlike the hold-up concept, [holdout] does 
not originate in the economic literature, but rather from industry stakeholders and from judges 
and lawyers involved in FRAND litigation.”). 
 15. Epstein, supra note 14, at 559. 
 16. Barak Atiram, The Wretched of Eminent Domain: Holdouts, Free-Riding and the 
Overshadowed Problem of Blinded-Riders, BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 52, 55-56, 67 
(2016). 
 17. Id. at 89. Atriam says that holdout arises in opposite situations as externalities. 
 18. Thomas Miceli, Free Riders, Holdouts, and Public Use: A Tale of Two Externalities, 
148 PUB. CHOICE 105, 107 (2011). 
 19. Jongwook Kim & Joseph Mahoney, Resource Based and Property Rights Perspectives 
on Value Creation: The Case of Oil Field Unitization, 23 MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECON. 
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firms on a reservoir leads to “extraordinary wastes” in the form of 
duplication of wells, inflated capital costs, decreasing extraction 
efficiency, environmental hazards, etc.20 The industry consensus is 
therefore that oil producers should delegate field production to a single 
firm, and distribute the net returns on the basis of a pre-designated 
sharing formula. However, field unitization is often incomplete 
because oil firms tend to holdout from the agreement due to conflicts 
over the sharing of benefits.21 
Another possible illustration is land assembly. When a single 
buyer seeks to consolidate many contiguous but separately owned 
parcels of land, each potential seller is in position to extract rent from 
the buyer by holding out from the transaction.22 A common example is 
an oil refining company that wants to construct an underground 
pipeline to transport oil from a field to a refinery, but must obtain rights 
of way from a variety of parcels owners.23  
The legal and economic literature also consistently discusses 
holdout in relation to acquisitions by the State. Oftentimes, the 
Government must purchase “large tracts of land from many owners in 
order to provide some public goods, such as military bases, airports, 
highways, and wilderness areas.”24 When those projects demand 
“contiguity,” the last owner may “hold out.” If negotiation is not 
possible and purchase is precluded, takings under the power of eminent 
domain may come into play,25 within the limits set forth in the Fifth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.26 
Corporate takeovers are another example of practical holdout.27 
Suppose that a raider needs to acquire 50% of the shares of a target 
corporation to gain control, and that shareholding is diluted. In this 
situation, minority shareholders may holdout of tendering their shares, 
																																								 																				
225, 232 (2002). 
 20. GARY LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 93-95 (1989).  
 21. Gary Libecap & Steven Wiggins, The Influence of Private Contractual Failure on 
Regulation: The Case of Oil Field Unitization, 93 J. POL. ECON. 690, 698-99 (1985). 
 22. Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. POL. ECON. 473, 474 
(1976). 
 23. Thomas Merrill, Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 75 (1986). 
 24. ROBERT COOTER AND THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 177 (Sally Yagan et al. 
eds., 6th ed. 2012). 
 25. Id. See also Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis and the Law, in 3 
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1661, 1688 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 
2002); WERNER Z. HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS 27-28 (3d ed. 1999). 
 26. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”). 
 27. Gregg Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a 
Merge? J.L. & ECON. 151, 152 (1985); Mami Kobayashi, The Role of Large Shareholders in 
Hostile Takeovers 3 (Kinki Univ., Working Paper No. E-4, 2005). 
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and undermine the completion of the proposed acquisition.28 This may 
be because they hope to extract rent from the raider, up to his 
opportunity cost. Alternatively, the holdout stakeholders may 
anticipate that the raider is an efficient manager who will increase the 
firm’s profitability following the acquisition.29  
Wage negotiation by unions is the last area we analyze where 
holdouts occur.30 Holdout is viewed as an alternative to union strikes 
when contracts are renegotiated. Instead of a work interruption, 
workers continue to work under the terms of the old contract after the 
contract has expired.31 
Against this backdrop, it should be unsurprising that the concept 
of holdout is also used in relation to intellectual property rights 
(“IPRs”) in general, and patents in particular.32 Professor Golden 
defines holdouts as patent owners’ “demands for a better deal,” and 
studies how applications for injunctions—“holdout threats” —can 
entitle them to exact high royalties which he calls “holdout 
premiums.”33 In the literature, concerns for “patent holdout” are 
observed in the field of biotechnology patents. Professors Heller and 
Eisenberg, who are known for their work on the risk of an 
“anticommons tragedy” in genetic research, discuss in their seminal 
paper the existence of holdouts by patentees.34 Professors Burk and 
Lemley, two of the main U.S. patent theorists of the early 21st century, 
																																								 																				
 28. We acknowledge that, in U.S. corporate law, a remedy is brought to this holdout 
situation by compelling the minority shareholder to sell once the acquirer has reached a certain 
ownership percentage. 
 29. Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the 
Theory of the Corporation, 11 BELL J. ECON. 42, 44 (1980). 
 30. Steinar Holden, Wage Bargaining, Holdout, and Inflation, 49 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 
235, 237-38 (1997). 
 31. Peter Cramton & Joseph Tracy, Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and 
Data, AM. ECON. REV. 100, 101, 118 (1992). 
 32. Richard Posner, Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics Approach, 19 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 57, 61 (2005) (“[T]he longer the patent term, the more likely the invention space is to be 
cluttered with patents, requiring multiple negotiations and creating potential holdout problems.”). 
Similarly, Professor Robert Merges, long seen as the U.S. authority on IPR law, has employed 
the concept of holdout to describe IPR holders who refuse to bargain for strategic reasons. See 
Robert Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective 
Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1298 (1996); The concept has also been used by the 
Department of Justice in Letter from Joel I. Klein. See Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y 
Gen., Dept. of Justice, Antitrust Division, to Gerrard R. Beeney, Esq. (Dec. 16, 1998). 
 33. John Golden, Patent Trolls and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2114, 2125, 
2136 (2006). 
 34. Michael Heller & Rebecca Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 700 (1998) (“[T]he lack of substitutes for 
certain biomedical discoveries (such as patented genes or receptors) may increase the leverage of 
some patent holders, thereby aggravating holdout problems.”). 
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have called “holdouts” firms that own “narrow biotechnology patents” 
who “refuse to license their essential sliver of the pie unless bribed.”35  
With all this, patent holdout seems to be a term of art that need 
not be restricted to a specific industry. Lichtman, for instance, talks of 
“patent holdout” in relation to technical standards to describe the 
conduct of patent claimants who sue to extract excessive royalties from 
unlicensed implementers or who refuse to submit their patents to 
SSOs.36  
B. First-Order Properties of Holdout 
From the reviewed literature, several first order properties of 
holdout emerge. We discuss them in turn. 
1. Ownership, Property, and Private Goods 
In mainstream economics, the holdout firm is a property owner. 
In the studies reviewed above, holdout invariably occurs when an 
economic agent owns a private good or service that is excludable. Put 
differently, the common thread to holdout by landowners, 
shareholders, workers or patentees is to benefit from entitlements 
protected by a property rule. Under this system, the entitlement is 
protected and enforced with injunctions. This ensures that “no one can 
take the entitlement to private property from the holder unless the 
holder sells it willingly and at the price at which he subjectively values 
the property.”37  
The upshot is twofold. First, it is unconventional to talk of holdout 
to denote the conduct of economic agents who are not property owners. 
Conversely, if an economic agent impinges on the property of another 
person, then the concepts that should be used relate to trespass, theft or 
piracy. This remark has many important implications that are explored 
in the next sections. 
Second, holdout power is a function of the effectiveness of the 
property rule. Endogenous or exogenous factors may render property 
																																								 																				
 35. Dan Burk & Mark Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1155, 1173-82 (2002); Dan Burk & Mark Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law,” 89 VA. L. REV. 
1575, 1611 (2003); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Varying the Course in Patenting Genetic 
Material: A Counter-Proposal to Richard Epstein's Steady Course, 4-5 (N.Y.U. Pub. L. & Legal 
Theory Res. Paper Series, No. 59, 2003), http://bit.do/VaryingtheCourse (referring to the same 
term of art to discuss refusals to license patented biotechnology material).  
 36. Douglas Gary Lichtman, Patent Holdouts and the Standard Setting Process, 2-3 (Univ. 
of Chicago Coase-Sandor Inst. L. & Econs., Olin Working Paper No. 292, 2006), 
http://bit.do/Lichtman-PatentHoldouts. 
 37. Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1105, 1127 (1972). 
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enforcement imperfect, uncertain or costly, and in turn limit holdout 
power. Patent infringements may for instance be difficult to detect or 
courts may not grant injunctions automatically.38 By the same token, if 
society chooses to make adjustments to the property rule (and/or 
remedies), and move to a liability rule where entitlements can be 
transferred with compensation, then holdout is no longer an issue.39 
Similarly, property rights over intangibles, as opposed to “real 
property,”40 may give less holdout power simply because detection of 
infringements is more costly with intangibles than with tangibles. 
2. Strangers, Nonmarket Exchange, and Coordination 
Problems 
Holdout corresponds to a situation where strangers do not 
transact.41 No coordination occurs between A and B even though it may 
be in their reciprocal interest to exchange. In particular, the owner of a 
valuable resource chooses not to sell even though a positive economic 
surplus may be shared between him and a buyer.42  
These features help distinguish holdout from other fields of 
economics that study the governance of exchange, which focus on the 
factors that are conducive to agreement (exchange of hostages, of 
promises, etc.) or that govern a pre-entered agreement (contingency 
clauses, default rules in incomplete contracts, etc.).  
3. Distribution vs. Efficiency 
Any student of holdout can instantly notice that the scholarship is 
divided on whether holdout is a distributional or an efficiency problem. 
On one side of the spectrum, some studies essentially discuss holdout 
as a bargaining problem. Holdout occurs when economic agents fail to 
agree over the sharing of economic surplus. Wiggins and Libecap talk 
of the failure of oil unitization as another example of distributional 
conflicts over rental shares.43 Epstein gives a stylized description of 
distributional holdout:  
																																								 																				
 38. Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court's Accidental 
Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 205-06 (2012). 
 39. Id. at 238.  
 40. Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 357 (1991). 
 41. Richard Epstein, Scott Kieff, & Daniel Spulber, The FTC, IP, and SSOs: Government 
Hold-Up Replacing Private Coordination, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 17 (2012) (“In 
contrast, the holdout problem is one that arises between strangers who have had no course of 
dealing with each other.”). 
 42. Edward López & J. R. Clark, The Problem With the Holdout Problem, 9 REV. L. & 
ECON. 151, 151 (2013). 
 43. See Libecap & Wiggins, supra note 21, at 698. 
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Holdout problems usually arise when the consent that has to 
be obtained must be obtained from some person whose 
welfare is negatively affected by A's conduct. But there is no 
strict reason why this limitation has to be observed. It could 
well be the case that the power to holdout is given to B, who 
stands to lose nothing if A has his way. B has a holdout 
position simply by virtue of the fact that A cannot undertake 
some desired action without her consent. Where the unique 
consent of B is necessary for A to act, the question is whether 
some form of bargaining breakdown will prevent these two 
parties from achieving the state of affairs that leave both better 
off than before.44 
On the other side, several studies look at holdout through the lens 
of economic inefficiency.45 In this variant, holdout is depicted as a 
“market failure,” which prevents wealth maximizing transactions from 
taking place.46 The point is that holdout economic agents undertake a 
suboptimal amount of socially beneficial activities. For instance, when 
holdout occurs in land assembly, the market may lead to suboptimal-
sized assemblies.47 Another inefficiency is delay. Hirsch notes that 
holdouts can “retard the completion of important projects.”48 A last 
inefficiency is political. When regulators are granted the power to 
correct socially inefficient holdout (for example, under eminent 
domain), they may go beyond this and address “non-holdouts” too. 
Lopez and Clark explain that regulators may attempt not only to 
remedy strategic holdout, but also “sincere” holdout.49 This happens, 
for example, when local institutions function as real estate companies 
essentially buying and selling properties, leasing to commercial and 
retail tenants, etc. 
This diversity denotes that the welfare effects of holdout are 
largely an empirical question. The upshot of this is that it is 
inappropriate to talk of holdout firms as “monopolists,”50 to assume 
that holdout is a “market failure,”51 or to say that holdout occurs in 
																																								 																				
 44. See Epstein, supra note 14, at 559. See also Merrill, supra note 23, at 65 (drawing a 
similar distinction “can lead to monopoly pricing by the seller, to unacceptably high transaction 
costs, or to both”). 
 45. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 37, at 1118-19. 
 46. See Atiram, supra note 16, at 56. See also Cohen, supra note 40, at 358-59, 362. 
 47. See Merrill, supra note 23, at 76-77. 
 48. See HIRSCH, supra note 25, at 28; See also Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 25, at 1688 
(noting that the takings power can resolve delays encountered in purchases negotiation with a 
recalcitrant parcel seller, and therefore be socially advantageous).  
 49. See López & Clark, supra note 42, at 158. 
 50. See HIRSCH, supra note 25, at 32. 
 51. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 40, at 358-59, 362. 
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“thin market” settings.52 With exceptions,53 the economics literature 
has avoided to follow that route. It treats holdout as a circumstantial 
problem that may, depending on the circumstances, degenerate into an 
efficiency issue.54   
As a matter of logic, the answer as to whether holdout is a 
distributional or an efficiency issue need not be binary. Instead, it is a 
matter of degree, and a function of the existence of imperfect 
substitutes to the holdout asset. Consider the example of A that is held 
out by B. If we assume that the distance between the letters of the 
alphabet denotes imperfect substitutability, then holdout will be 
distributional if A can turn to C, D and E which are imperfect but close 
substitutes. However, holdout will produce efficiency losses if A’s 
alternatives are X, Y and Z, which are distant and very imperfect 
substitutes. At the extreme, holdout or the potential for holdout could 
result in the lack of transactions altogether. 
4. Self-Interest 
In mainstream economics, holdout is described as a form of self-
interest. The literature envisions holdout as rational and utilitarian 
conduct. In some studies, holdout is discussed by reference to “strategic 
reasons.” Cohen writes, for instance, that “successful holdout requires 
accurate information and a high degree of negotiating, bargaining, and 
bluffing skills.”56 That said, it is unclear if those authors have anything 
other than profit maximization in mind. Even the most serious holdout 
scenarios, such as necessity cases (e.g., the boat owner stranded in a 
sudden storm who needs access to a dock), involve no more than 
ordinary garden-variety profit maximization.55  
We give weight to this point to stress that the literature does not 
make bad behavior determinant of holdout. There is no moral 
judgment on the degree of “honesty” or “candor” of the holdout agent. 
Neither is there a suggestion that holdout implies any form of “fraud,” 
“deceit,” or “guile.”  
																																								 																				
 52. See Merrill, supra note 23, at 65. See also Howard Shelanski & Peter Klein, Empirical 
Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment, 11  J.L. ECON. & ORG. 335, 
340 (1995). 
 53. See HIRSCH, supra note 25, at 32. 
 54. See Kim & Mahoney, supra note 19, at 230, 233 (talking of holdout as a contracting 
problem: “profit-maximizing incentives of individual oil firms, including potential holdout 
motives, lead to inflexible economic and political positions, making contracting difficult.”). See 
also Pierre Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1661, 1673 (1989) 
(talking of a “classic pattern of transactions costs.”).  
 56. See Cohen, supra note 40, at 359. 
 55. See Epstein, supra note 14, at 577. 
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This point is better seen through three examples, all of which are 
taken from the market for control of corporations. Consider first a 
proposed takeover, where it is anticipated that the share price will 
increase under the new management. In this setting, each and every 
rational shareholder has an incentive to hold out and demand a share of 
the gain expected to result from the change of control, and there is no 
guile in this. 
Consider next that the raider is a foreign firm, and that one 
shareholder is an activist patriot. In this variant, the shareholder may 
holdout of a welfare enhancing transaction simply by virtue of his own 
political beliefs.  
Lastly, assume that the raider has already bought a majority of the 
stock of the target, after having obtained early informal assurances by 
the minority shareholders that they would sell. Short of control, the 
reselling value of a majority stake on the market is limited. The 
minority shareholders, who are aware of the raider’s substantial 
opportunity cost, may renege on their informal promise and holdout to 
extract more than the “true value” of their share.56 
In all three instances, holdout arises. The common thread to all 
such scenarios is that the incentives of the property owner and the other 
parties are not aligned. But the occurrence of bad behaviour – in the 
third scenario – is merely coincidental, not determinant. 
C. The Deviation Hypothesis 
Surprisingly, in regard to patent policy, a current of economics 
literature has deviated from the term of art of holdout, and instead used 
systematically a distinct concept of patent “holdup” to refer to patent 
owners’ refusal to license their patents. Below, we describe the turn 
taken in this current of the economic literature. We then expose how 
the concept of patent holdup strays from established mainstream 
economics. Finally, we explore the possible impact of this deviation in 
policy and law-making circles. 
1. Patent Holdup Theory 
Instead of resorting to the established concept of holdout, a 
number of economists interested in patent policy in the early 2000s 
have systematically started to use a concept of “holdup” to talk of a 
patent owners’ strategies.57 This movement has been widely followed 
																																								 																				
 56. See generally Thomas Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, A Bargaining Model of Holdouts 
and Takings, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 160 (2007). 
 57. Until then, the concept of patent holdup was only casually used in economics, and often 
to denote something slightly different. For instance, the patent “holdup” problem discussed by 
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in subsequent economics research. It has progressively spilled over into 
law and policy papers; and today, there is a substantial body of 
derivative literature on “patent holdup.” Amongst this scholarly 
thicket, the seminal economic works are essentially traceable to four 
papers, the common thread of which is to feature Berkeley economist 
and former U.S. Department of Justice official Professor Carl Shapiro 
as author or co-author. Those four papers consist of: a non-formal 
policy paper of 2001 (“the policy paper”); a formal economics working 
paper of 2006 which was later published in the American Law and 
Economics Review (“the economics paper”); one interdisciplinary 
paper of 2007, written with the famous IP lawyer Mark Lemley, funded 
by several high tech firms, and published in the Texas Law Review 
(“the interdisciplinary paper”); and one antitrust paper of 2007 written 
with Joseph Farrell and two economic consultants (“the antitrust 
paper”).58 Interestingly, those four papers are the “standard narrative” 
to support remedial initiatives against patent holdup.59 Yet, they draw 
on restrictive assumptions, intuitions and specifications that are often 
ignored in law and policy debates. In the next subsections, we unearth 
the specificities of the four holdup papers. 
1.1. The Policy Paper 
In “Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licences, Patent Pools 
and Standard Setting,” Shapiro discusses generally how “cumulative 
innovation” can be stifled by “blocking patents,” and considers the risk 
that the IP laws have created a “patent thicket.” This paper is not 
technical, but qualitative. It covers several issues, including cross-
licensing and patent pools, but the central theme is the “holdup 
problem” which is given exposition in several full sections.60  
Shapiro considers the situation of manufacturers who assemble 
various inputs and who may design products and place them into large-
scale production without information on patents likely to issue.61 
																																								 																				
Chang in 1995 is one whereby a follow-on inventor obtains a patent on an improvement of an 
initial patent. See Howard Chang, Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation, 26 
RAND J. ECON. 34, 35 (1995). See also Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 25, at 1698 (arguing 
similarly that “subsequent innovators whose inventions depend on prior patented works will need 
to obtain licenses from existing patent-holders, and hold-up problems may arise”). 
 58. See generally Joseph Farrell, John Hayes, Carl Shapiro, & Theresa Sullivan, Standard 
Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603 (2007). 
 59. Jonathan Barnett, Has the Academy Led Patent Law Astray?, BERKELEY TECH. L.J.  
(forthcoming 2017). 
 60. See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and 
Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 119, 124-26 (A. Jaffe, J. Lerner, & S. Stern, 
eds., 2001). 
 61. Id. at 119 (“[N]ew products will inadvertently infringe on patents issued after these 
products were designed.”).  
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Because of what he later calls “hidden patents,”62 those manufacturers 
are “highly susceptible to hold up” by patent owners, who can shut 
them down by seeking injunctive relief. As a result, patent owners can 
extract “far greater royalties.”63 Shapiro says that the “holdup problem” 
would be particularly acute “in industries where hundreds if not 
thousands of patents, some already issued, others pending, can 
potentially read on a given product.” From a social standpoint, patent 
holdup arguably generates welfare costs. Some manufacturers “will 
refrain from introducing products for fear of hold-up.” Others will be 
forced to pay royalties that will be “reflected in the price of final 
goods.”64  
In this initial paper Shapiro discusses under the label “holdup,” 
conduct that was formerly called holdout in prior literature.65 However, 
the policy paper makes no reference to holdout.66  
1.2. The Interdisciplinary Paper 
The interdisciplinary paper is a joint effort with Mark Lemley, a 
well-known intellectual property (“IP”) and antitrust academic. As its 
title suggests—“Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking”—the 
interdisciplinary paper builds on the analytical intuition laid down in 
the previous policy paper. It is, however, more focused, more formal 
and more documented.  
The problem of “patent holdup” is discussed as follows: 
“injunction threats” entitle patent owners to “negotiate royalties far in 
excess of the patent holder’s true economic contribution.” Injunction 
threats often involve a strong element of “hold up in the common 
circumstance in which the defendant has already invested heavily in 
the design, manufacture, market and sell of the product.”67 This is a 
concern in “the case of private standard setting” because “it can be 
extremely costly or even impossible as a practical matter to ‘redesign’ 
a product standard to avoid infringing a patented technology.”68 In such 
																																								 																				
 62. Id. at 126, 141 (referring to the fact that patent applications are secret, slow to issue, 
and that information on such patents is not optimal and/or that patent owners may conceal their 
positions).  
 63. Id. at 125.  
 64. Id. at 126. 
 65. In particular Heller and Eisenberg, who are cited in one section of the paper. Id. at 148. 
 66. The paper does not reference to any clear school of economic thinking or legal authority 
in relation to holdup. 
 67. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 1993.  
 68. Id. at 2016. The patent holdup problem is also especially acute in relation to cases 
where the “injunction is based on a patent covering one small component of a complex, profitable, 
and popular product,” like in the information technology sector. Id. at 1993. Moreover, the model 
is primarily designed to address patent assertion entities, and the extension to standards is simply 
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settings, the cost borne by the defendant to switch technologies 
midstream is the one driving the royalties upwards, not the value of the 
patented technology.69  
The “basic economic model” on which those claims are made 
involves an infringer who is already selling the product when it learns 
of the patent claim. This occurs as a result of unawareness, of lack of 
information on the patent, or of strategic conduct by the patent owner. 
Notice, however, that those specifications fare poorly with the private 
standard setting context, where patents receive exposure at several 
iterative stages: ex-ante disclosure requirements, ongoing 
technological scrutiny in patent committees and ex-post dissemination 
through the standards publication and the creation of standard essential 
patent databases by SSOs. 
Besides this, Lemley and Shapiro add an important tweak to the 
previous paper. They extend their concept of patent holdup to situations 
where the “patent holder approaches the downstream firm before that 
firm has designed its product.”70 Admittedly, in this case, the risk of 
holdup should be limited. The potential implementer has not yet sunk 
investments in the product and can either attempt to design its product 
around the patent or decide to invest in other markets. In turn, the level 
of the royalties that the patent holder can demand decreases. Yet, 
because the potential implementer will end up taking a license over a 
patent that is “probabilistic,” this leads to the charging of royalties for 
weak patents.71 We call this extension the “weak patent holdup theory.” 
It suggests that patent owners are sometimes paid negotiated royalties, 
which exceed what could be obtained in court.72  
The interdisciplinary paper again applies holdup to the conduct of 
a property owner, this time with more sophistication. And again, there 
is no reference to the economics discussed previously.73  
																																								 																				
implied theoretically and substantiated with two short cases (3G and WiFi), where no empirical 
evidence of substantial patent holdup effects has been observed as predicted in the ten years since 
the paper was written. Id. at 2025-27. 
 69. Id. at 2008. Holdup occurs when the patent owner can capture value that has nothing 
to do with its invention. 
 70. Id. at 2004. 
 71. Id. In fact, the weaker the patent, the higher the holdup. They write later about “those 
weak patents that have the potential to hold up a large proportion of non-infringing contributions.” 
Id. at 2008. Even if the infringer litigates the validity of the patent, early knowledge of a weak 
patent may backfire under the patent damages rules on willful patent infringement. 
 72. Lemley and Shapiro do not seem to contemplate that invalidity proceedings remain 
available to the licensee in this paper. Moreover, the paper does not acknowledge that standard 
essential patents are often stronger that non-essential ones. See Anne Layne-Farrar & Josh Lerner, 
To Join or Not to Join: Examining Patent Pool Participation and Rent Sharing Rules, 29 INT’L J. 
INDUS. ORG. 294-303 (2011).  
 73. This is perplexing given that Lemley had previously talked of holdout to denote the 
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1.3. The Economics Paper 
In 2010, Shapiro published a paper entitled “Injunctions, Hold-up 
and Patent Royalties” in the American Law and Economics Review. 
This paper is “pure” economics. It purports to provide a formal 
demonstration of the conjectures developed in the previous papers.  
The economics paper conveys the same understanding of 
holdup.74 Essentially, the point is that “[t]he right to obtain an 
injunction . . . gives the patent holder the power to hold up an infringing 
firm that has made specific investments to design, manufacture, and 
sell the infringing product.”75 But in addition to the “hidden patent” 
case where the implementer inadvertently invests without knowing it 
infringes—here renamed “patent surprise”—Shapiro carries on with 
the expansive weak patent holdup theory introduced in the 
interdisciplinary paper. This extension—here called “early negotiation 
scenario”—claims that holdup may happen even when the implementer 
has not incurred sunk investments.76 This scenario contemplates the 
situation in which the potential licensee “can design its product to 
include, or exclude, the patented feature, at no extra design cost, and 
still have sufficient time to introduce its product as planned at time 
zero.”77 The point is that weak patents may be licensed at rates in 
excess of the true value that they would garner in damages litigation:  
when early negotiations are valuable to the downstream firm, 
[the potential licensee] best threat, designing around the 
patent, is equivalent to conceding that the patent is valid and 
infringed without a fight. In this situation, the downstream 
firm does not get any reduction in royalties to reflect the 
probabilistic nature of the patent, so the royalty rate, βv, is not 
discounted at all to reflect any weakness of the patent.78 
1.4. The Antitrust Paper 
The antitrust paper pays more attention to prior economic 
research. The authors explain that their focus is on a problem “that 
																																								 																				
conduct of patent property owners in the biotechnology industry. Note that the main “economic 
theory” that Lemley and Shapiro use is a standard Nash bargaining model. Lemley & Shapiro, 
supra note 1, at 1995-98. 
 74. The paper is the revised version of a “working paper” released four years before.  
 75. Shapiro, supra note 3, at 283. “[D]ownstream users . . . are subject to holdup because 
they must make sunk investments that are specific to using the patented technology.” Id. at 284. 
 76. Id. at 300 (“[T]his means that the equilibrium in the early negotiations game is the same 
as in the hold-up game.”). 
 77. Id. at 298-99. “[T]he patent holder can still profit . . . even if the downstream firm is 
fully aware of the patent infringement claim against it when it initially designs its product.” Id. at 
285. 
 78. Id. at 299. 
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economists call ‘opportunism’ or ‘hold-up,’”79 which branches into a 
specific field of economics known as “transaction cost economics” 
(“TCE”).80 In turn, their understanding of holdup seems restricted to 
cases where users have made “sunk specific investments in the course 
of beginning (or preparing) to use the patented technology.”81 This is 
congruent with TCE, which posits specific investments as a necessary 
condition of holdup. However, TCE theory seems also to be given a 
tweak. The authors consider that patent holdup is conceivable without 
“opportunism” or “guile,” as requested in the seminal works of Oliver 
Williamson. The antitrust paper argues that the “patent holdup” 
concept applies beyond ambush cases where the patent owner engages 
in “deception” or “strategically postpone disclosure to SSOs.” This 
entitles its authors, in particular, to characterize as patent holdup cases 
where a patent owner and an implementer do not conclude a license 
because they disagree on the level of FRAND royalties.82  
2. Patent Holdup vs. Mainstream Economics 
Now that we have a rounded exposition of the current of literature 
that some call patent holdup theory,83 we can detect that it marks a 
deviation from the frame of reference of mainstream economics. As  
shown, it is conventional in economics literature to call holdout the 
position held by a property owner whose consent must be obtained by 
a third party willing to undertake market activity. This situation 
corresponds to the problem studied in the four papers: a patent owner’s 
ability to shut down an economic agent willing to manufacture 
products that use the patented technology. We observe, in particular, 
three constituent features of holdout. First, we are witnessing the 
conduct of a property owner – namely the patent owner – who owns a 
good or service that is excludable. This important property exists 
																																								 																				
 79. See Farrell et al., supra note 58, at 603-04 (“[O]pportunism or hold-up arises when a 
gap between economic commitments and subsequent commercial negotiations enables one party 
to capture part of the fruits of another’s investment, broadly construed.”). 
 80. But in reality, it goes as far as Ronald Coase. See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the 
Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). See also Oliver Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The 
Natural Progression, 86 J. RETAILING 215 (2010). 
 81. See Farrell et al., supra note 58, at 612. 
 82. Though the authors say that in this situation, there is almost guile in the sense of the 
breach of a promise. See Farrell et al., supra note 58, at 659 (“Conceptually, demanding non-
FRAND royalties ex post is either deceptive (the patent holder’s representation that it would offer 
FRAND licenses was untruthful) or the breaking of a commitment (the patent holder subsequently 
decided not to honor its FRAND commitment.”). 
 83. They could be complemented by other papers, cited in the four reviewed. See Joseph 
Farrell & Carl Shapiro, How Strong are Weak Patents?, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 1347, 1347-69 
(2008). See also Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75 
(2005). 
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through the ability of the patent owner to seek (or threaten to seek) 
injunctive relief in court, even though the good or service is not 
tangibly but intangibly excludable. 
Second, we see that the patent owner’s conduct does not 
necessarily involve “bad behavior.” Like the minority shareholder who 
refuses to sell his shares in anticipation of higher profits or the parcel 
owner who refuses drilling rights to an oil company on environmental 
grounds, the patent owner may have legitimate reasons to refuse a 
license (like proprietary exploitation). This point is expressly central in 
all four papers, which repeatedly insist that the theory shall not be 
restricted to cases of “opportunism,” “guile,” “ambush,” or “deceit.”  
Third, we discuss here the conduct of economic agents who have 
had little or no course of transacting with each other (even within SSOs 
which do not govern commercial transactions).84 In both the “patent 
surprise” and the “early negotiations” scenarios, we are in an 
antecedent situation of “non-market exchange” characteristic of 
holdout.85 This situation is distinct from the typical holdup setting,86 
which assumes prior coordination through contract (even if 
incomplete), and subsequent hazard in exchange relationships. The 
submission of a FRAND commitment should change nothing, and does 
not create a pre-contractual framework or agreement, because such 
declarations are unilateral in origin, abstract in content, anticipative in 
time and impersonal in scope.87 In holdup, the parties know each other. 
To achieve a contractual effect, a symmetrical commitment should be 
taken ex ante by prospective implementers (note that they do not 
necessarily participate in technical standardization), which would 
manifest the general acceptance of the patent owner’s FRAND 
commitment before the SSO. Short of such acceptance, the sole 
contract that may be envisioned, if at all, is with the SSO.88  
This should have driven the writers of the four papers to use the 
concept of “patent holdout.” Instead, they discuss the issue under the 
“patent holdup” label. This terminological orientation is not in itself a 
																																								 																				
 84. Epstein et al., supra note 41, at 17 (“In contrast, the holdout problem is one that arises 
between strangers who have had no course of dealing with each other.”) (emphasis added). 
 85. The argument is if one is aware of the potential opportunism of FRAND ex ante and 
believe it to be a significant problem, then why would one make investments in specific assets? 
 86. Shelanski & Klein, supra note 52, at 336. 
 87. All SSOs make clear that they are not commercial forums.  
 88. Hanns Ullrich, FRAND Access to Open Standards and the Patent Exclusivity: 
Restating the Principles 32 (Max Planck Inst. Innovation & Competition, Res. Paper No. 17-04, 
2017), http://bit.do/Ullrich-FRANDAccess (“[I]n short, in the E.U., the contractual road to the 
enforcement of FRAND commitments, if available at all, is rather unsafe, [even] more so as SSOs 
have proved highly unwilling or unable to enforce contractual obligations (potentially) resulting 
from the FRAND commitments made by their participants.”). 
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problem. There is fortunately no prescription that commands the use of 
specific concepts in social science. Yet, all theories (even the most 
generic) are language-specific and hypotheses-dependent. In a famous 
article on the methodology of positive economics, Milton Friedman 
wrote:  
A theory is, in general, a complex intermixture of two 
elements. In part, it is a “language” designed to promote 
“systematic and organized methods of reasoning.” In part, it 
is a body of substantive hypotheses designed to abstract 
essential features of complex reality.89 
To be sure, the four papers tie their findings to the economics of 
holdup, and specifically to TCE. This would certainly suffice to 
assuage our methodological concerns, provided that TCE theory is a 
better fit to their subject of inquiry. But this is less than certain. 
Alexander Galetovic and Stephen Haber have demonstrated that the 
reviewed literature marks a deviation from the classic understanding of 
holdup in that it dispenses with the requirement of “opportunistic 
surprise.”90 As they write, this is a significant omission, because 
opportunism is deemed a necessary condition of holdup by virtually all 
TCE scholars.91 This omission might be driven by an ambition to 
extend the scope of the theory to the open and participative context of 
standardized technologies, where surprise is by definition absent 
(notably due to the fact that the standardisation process is open and that 
SSOs publish databases with relevant SEPs). 
But the most important issue lies elsewhere. The literature 
dispenses with perhaps the most foundational requirement of holdup in 
TCE, namely “asset specificity” which creates the potential for 
opportunism.92 This problem can be seen at several levels. Let us recall 
																																								 																				
 89. Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE 
ECONOMICS, 3, 7 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1953). 
 90. Alexander Galetovic & Stephen Haber, The Fallacies of Patent-Holdup Theory, 13 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 20-27 (2017). 
 91. Only a minor fringe of the scholarship envisions the existence of firms without 
opportunism. See generally James H. Love, On the Opportunism-Independent Theory of the Firm, 
29 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 381 (2005). 
 92. See Williamson, supra note 80 at 463-64 (“For transaction cost economizing purposes, 
the critical dimensions of transactions are complexity, the condition of asset specificity, and the 
disturbances to which a transaction is subject. As among these three, the attributes of transactions 
that have been most important to an understanding of the governance of contractual relations are 
the conditions of asset specificity and outlier disturbances for which unprogrammed adaptations 
are needed.”). See also Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford, & Armen Alchian, Vertical 
Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 
298 (1978) (the particular circumstance that makes opportunism likely is the “presence of 
appropriable specialized quasi rents. After a specific investment is made and such quasi rents are 
created, the possibility of opportunistic behavior is very real.”); Shelanski & Klein, supra note 
2017] PATENT “TRESPASS” & THE ROYALTY GAP 199 
the standard holdup example in the literature: firm A contracts with 
publishing firm B, and commits to install a site-specific printing press 
at the premises of B, anticipating a rental price of $5,500. But now that 
the printing press exists, and knowing that it would be operated even if 
its owner got as little as $1,500 (which is the press salvage value), B 
seeks ex-post excuses to renege on the contract to get the weekly rental 
down to $1,500. The publisher, for example, might plead that he is 
experiencing depressed business conditions, and that he will be unable 
to rent, unless the terms are revised.  
What we can see is that holdup necessitates one or more firm’s 
specific investment,93 the printing press in our example A. But the four 
papers fail to make this a necessary condition of patent holdup. True 
that specific investments are present in their “hidden patent”/“patent 
surprise” scenario, where the downstream manufacturer had designed 
his products in a way that infringed on the patent. But what lacks here 
is that those investments are not “transaction specific” because the 
infringer was not contemplating any transaction when he incurred 
them.94 Moreover, their proposed expansion to “early negotiation” 
settings where none of the firms has yet made design choices removes 
specific investments from the picture. Recall that the policy paper 
purports that patent holdup can occur even when the “patent holder 
approaches the downstream firm before that firm has designed its 
product.”95  
There are also other ambiguities regarding the proposed 
connection between TCE and patent holdup theory. For example, TCE 
views holdup as a multidirectional phenomenon. It can come from both 
parties to an exchange, seller and buyer. And in fact, in the initial 
holdup example, the seller makes a specific investment, and the buyer 
holds him up by depressing the price.96 This should have driven the 
four papers to contemplate the possibility of holdup of patent owners 
by downstream manufacturers. By this, we mean whether technology 
developers, namely patent holders, who make specific investments into 
																																								 																				
52, at 337 (noting that amongst the several conditions of TCE, “asset specificity is held to be 
particularly important”); Aric Rindfleisch & Jan B. Heide, Transaction Cost Analysis: Past, 
Present, and Future Applications, 61 J. MARKETING 30, 32-39 (1997) (defining asset specificity 
as one “independent variable” of transaction costs analysis). 
 93. See Klein et al., supra note 92, at 299 (The definition of asset specific investment is: 
an investment in “an asset [that] may be so expensive to remove or so specialized to a particular 
user that if the price paid to the owner were somehow reduced the asset's services to that user 
would not be reduced.”).  
 94. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985) 
(discussing the concept of “transaction specific” investments). 
 95. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 2005.  
 96. Holdup can be bidirectional.  
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R&D that possibly leads to patents, can be ex post held up by 
technology implementers who want to bring licensing terms down.97 
Yet, not a trace of that hypothesis can be found in the literature 
supporting patent holdup. This point is particularly apt because R&D 
investments are the canonical example of sunk costs in mainstream 
economics. And, as is well-known, sunk costs elevate exit barriers, 
which trap firms in business even though they earn low or negative 
returns.98 
Finally, there is one last discrepancy between the four papers’ 
subject of inquiry and TCE theory. Holdup in TCE requires a 
contracting framework, which is what triggers firms’ commitment of 
resources into specific assets.99 The presence of an initial contract, be 
it complete or incomplete, between patent owners and implementers 
when they enter into licensing discussions is, however, a contentious 
issue, and it is not entirely clear that the FRAND commitment 
submitted to a SSO is a substitute to a contract.100 In the U.S., the Ninth 
Circuit has found in Microsoft v. Motorola that a RAND commitment 
created “contractual obligations.” However, at the same time, many 
other cases seem to refuse to consider that a FRAND commitment 
categorically creates such a contract.101 An even more ad hoc situation 
exists in the European Union, where the Court of Justice held in 
Huawei v. ZTE that FRAND commitments create “legitimate 
																																								 																				
 97. See Shelanski & Klein, supra note 52, at 337-38. The authors identify R&D as a 
possible asset-specific investment. They then quantify “R&D expenditure, as a proxy for physical 
asset specificity.” Id. at 338. We admit here that all patent holders (or at least inventors) almost 
always incur sunk costs before they negotiate patent licenses, and that not all of them are exposed 
to holdup because those costs are sunk. Yet, in the standardization arena, R&D investments are 
planned ex ante in light of a structured process of technology development with the future 
expectation of licensing transactions. This is very different from the situation of the lone, creative 
inventor who tinkers in his garage. 
 98. See Kathryn Harrigan, Deterrents to Divestiture, 24 ACAD. MGMT. J. 306 (1981). See 
also Paul Geroski, Richard J. Gilbert, & Alexis Jacquemin, Barriers to Entry and Strategic 
Competition, in 41 FUNDAMENTALS OF PURE AND APPLIED ECONOMICS 97 (Jacques Lesourne & 
Hugo Sonnenschien eds., 1990). 
 99. Shelanski & Klein, supra note 52, at 341. 
 100. See Garrard Beeney, FRAND and SEPs in the U.S., INTELL. ASSET MGMT., July-Aug. 
2016, http://bit.do/Beeney-FRANDandSEPs (“FRAND commitments are generally considered to 
be contracts between the SSO and patent owner (with parties that practice the standard being 
third-party beneficiaries of those contract…).”). See also Roger Brooks & Damien Geradin, 
Interpreting and Enforcing the Voluntary FRAND Commitment, 9 INT’L J. IT STANDARDS & 
STANDARDIZATION RES. 1 (2011). But see Nicolas Petit, EU Competition Law Analysis of FRAND 
Disputes, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW (Jorge L. 
Contreras ed., 2017). 
 101. See Genband U.S. LLC v. Metaswitch Networks Corp., 211 F. Supp. 3d 858, 898-99 
(E.D. Tex. 2016) (Decision on Equitable Defenses), vacated, 861 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017). See 
also Certain Network Devices Related Software and Components Thereof (I), Inv. No. 337-TA-
944 (Feb. 2, 2016) (Initial Determination), (Jul. 26, 2016) (Commission Opinion).  
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expectations” on third parties,102 yet fell short of affirming that 
implementers can legitimately expect to be offered specific royalty 
levels.103 Upon further reading of the judgment, one gets the impression 
that the “legitimate expectations” generated by a FRAND commitment 
are not linear, and must be assessed on a case-by-case basis “in 
accordance with the undertaking given to the standardisation body.”104 
This dovetails with the reading of the German patent infringement 
courts, which have denied contractual enforceability to FRAND 
commitments.105 To add further confusion to the issue, in Unwired 
Planet International Ltd. and others, the U.K. Judge Birss noted that a 
FRAND commitment created a contractual framework between parties 
to the negotiation, yet went on to say that “there is no need for contract 
law to go as far as creating a power to compel parties to enter into 
FRAND licences against their will because patent law already has the 
tools available to give legal effect to the FRAND undertaking.”106 
Admittedly TCE did not require a contract in the legal sense to 
give rise to holdup, merely a type of potentially legally enforceable 
commitment. In this sense, Williamson talked of “contract as 
framework,” in opposition to the “iron-rule” arrangements usually 
defined as contracts in law and economics.107 Whilst we admit that 
incomplete and imperfectly enforceable contracts do not rule out 
holdup according to TCE, we note that the abovementioned judicial 
events call into question whether FRAND generates the type of 
complete or incomplete contractual paradigm that constitutes the basis 
of TCE.108 To put the point controversially, the intransigence of 
																																								 																				
 102. Case C-170/13, Huawei v. ZTE, 2015 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 477 at ¶ 53 (Jul. 16, 
2015). 
 103. See id. at ¶ 54 (noting that there may be disagreement between the parties on the actual 
FRAND terms). 
 104. Id. at ¶ 63. 
 105. See Haris Tsilikas, Huawei v. ZTE in Context–EU Competition Policy and 
Collaborative Standardization in Wireless Telecommunications, 48 IIC-INT’L REV. INTELL. 
PROP. & COMPETITION L. 151, 165 (2017) (“German patent infringement courts have interpreted 
FRAND commitments as mere declarations of an obligation to conclude a contract that already 
exists under German competition law. Denying the contractual enforceability of the FRAND 
commitment has the important implication that defendants in SEP infringement disputes cannot 
rely on contractual remedies when faced with unreasonable licensing demands.”). 
 106. See Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co. Ltd. [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711 [163] 
(Eng.) (Judge Birss explained the nature of those obligations as follows: “[t]he patentee is obliged 
by contract to take a FRAND approach to the negotiation and to grant a licence on FRAND terms. 
The implementer must take a FRAND approach to the negotiation and accept a licence on FRAND 
terms if it wishes to take advantage of the constraint on the patentee’s rights imposed by the 
FRAND undertaking.”). 
 107. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 94, at 4. 
 108. See Ullrich, supra note 88. See also Paul Joskow, The Role of Transaction Cost 
Economics in Antitrust and Public Utility Regulatory Policies, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1991) 
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recognizing any value to FRAND in certain jurisdictions hints that such 
pledges may have no more worth than cheap talk. Table 1 below 
provides a summary of the theoretical deviations discussed above. 
 
 
3. Impact 
Instead of using the established term of art of holdout, the four 
papers discuss the concept of holdup. We are not the first to notice that 
the language of the holdup papers deviates from accepted terminology. 
In a 2007 reply to the Interdisciplinary paper, John Golden observed in 
a footnote that Lemley and Shapiro had not used the classic term of 
“hold-out” which “primarily suggests a demand for a better deal,” and 
preferred a more “judgmental” concept of “holdup” which “suggests 
both criminal conduct and a threat of immediate harm.”109 In this 
section we carry this intuition further, and explore the possible side 
effects of this deviation. 
3.1 Anchoring 
Behavioral sciences can help explain why permuting holdout with 
holdup may not have been innocuous.110 The selection of holdup as a 
starting point is likely to anchor, in the behavioral sense, towards a 
benevolent and informed reader, including policy makers but also 
industry players and general public opinion, presenting a series of 
biases, priors and prejudices about patent owners and implementers.111 
As said before, holdup is a loaded concept. It embeds a host of strict 
																																								 																				
(discussing the need of a contractual framework in TCE). 
 109. See Golden, supra note 33, at 2114 n.16. 
 110. See Lichtman, supra note 36. That said, patent holdout has remained in use to denote 
the conduct of patent owners by a number of patent scholars and practitioners. See also Gavin 
George, What Is Hiding in the Bushes – eBay’s Effect on Holdout Behavior in Patent Thickets, 
13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 557 (2007). 
 111. Adrian Furnham & Hua Chu Boo, A Literature Review of the Anchoring Effect, 40 J. 
SOCIO-ECON. 35, 35 (2011) (“[A]nchoring bias is caused by insufficient adjustment because final 
judgements are assimilated toward the starting point of a judge’s deliberations.”). 
Holdout Holdup (TCE) 
Property 
owner 
Self 
interest 
Non-
contractual 
Opportunism 
(guile) 
Transaction 
specific assets 
“Patent Holdup” ✓ ✓ ✓ X X 
Hidden patent/
surprise 
✓ ✓ ✓ X 
✓ 
X 
✓ 
Early negotiation ✓ ✓ ✓ X X 
Table 1: Theoretical deviation from holdout to holdup 
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assumptions and it triggers a variety of normative inferences. Let us 
sift through some of them.  
First, using patent holdup accommodates the implicit idea that the 
patent owner must have at some point taken a commitment to license 
(at a certain specific rate level) vis-a-vis an unlicensed implementer.112 
In a standards context, a commonly heard story is that of “quid pro 
quo”:113 a patent has eventually been deemed essential by SSO 
participants—included in a standard’s specification—in exchange for 
a FRAND commitment by its owner. On the facts, however, this idea 
is entirely disingenuous, because (i) essentiality declarations are 
unilaterally made by patent owners from the outset, not collectively by 
SSO participants at the onset of the standardization process; and (ii) 
many patents that are declared essential by their owners are ultimately 
not included in standards. 
Second, the term holdup is connoted with a sense of unfair 
conduct. To be a little extreme, it portrays the firm that shirks on the 
alleged promise as a cheater, a villain, a liar. With this, even the most 
ordinary use of judicial remedies is seen as bad, unethical behavior by 
the patent owner.114 This helps to obfuscate the conventional economic 
wisdom whereby property rules and injunctions are generally 
appropriate when there are no transaction costs (even though this may 
need some contextualization).115  
Third, the use of holdup suggests that the infringing firm is the 
weak party to the exchange, because it is hostage of the patent owner 
by virtue of asset specific investments. Again, this completely leaves 
out of the picture that the patent owner may also have incurred sunk 
																																								 																				
 112  See Farrell et al., supra note 58, at 659 (“Conceptually, demanding non-FRAND 
royalties ex post is either deceptive (the patent holder’s representation that it would offer FRAND 
licenses was untruthful) or the breaking of a commitment (the patent holder subsequently decided 
not to honor its FRAND commitment).”). 
 113. Nicholas Banasevic, The Implications of the Court of Justice's Huawei/ZTE Judgment, 
6 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 463, 463 (2015). 
 114. See, e.g., Farrell et al., supra note 58, at 604 (“‘Bad’ behavior (such as deception) is 
not logically necessary for such inefficiency, but hold-up can powerfully reward deception and 
concealment.”). They add that “[t]he pure economics are largely unaffected by whether or not 
guile is involved, but of course policy and legal treatment may be strongly affected.” Id. And 
further, they say “[w]hile we focus primarily on such deception or failure to disclose patents, a 
similar economic logic underlies some cases where patents were disclosed but users assert that 
the patent holder is not meeting its duty to license in a reasonable fashion.” Id. at 605 (emphasis 
added). Later, again, the authors write about “more fundamentally, deceiving buyers or keeping 
them in the dark about the terms on which a technology will be available subverts the competitive 
process.” Id. at 609. 
 115. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 37, at 1127 (“[T]hat where transaction costs do 
not bar negotiations between polluter and victim, or where we are sufficiently certain who the 
cheapest cost avoider is, there are no efficiency reasons for allowing intentional takings, and 
property rules, supported by injunctions or criminal sanctions, are appropriate.”). 
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investments (e.g., in R&D) and that the power play between both 
parties is entirely relative. This also presupposes that injunctions are 
automatically granted, which is untenable as a matter of law and 
practice. Since the U.S. Supreme Court judgment in eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, LLC of 2006, injunctions are a subsidiary remedy that 
only becomes available when patent damages are proven 
inappropriate.116 And in Huawei v. ZTE, the Court of Justice of the E.U. 
has accepted that antitrust law can bring limitations to the free and 
unfettered exercise of patent remedies by FRAND-pledged SEP 
owners. 
The deviation from holdout to holdup thus moves the terms of the 
debate, in a sense that throws a whiff of suspicion on patent owners. It 
acts as a filter that colors the discussion and conveys preconceptions 
on patent holders and implementers.  
Had the discussion been conducted in holdout terms, and not 
through the filter of holdup, a wholly different picture would have 
emerged, and new policy directions may have been followed. First, 
when A uses B’s property without its consent, this can be called 
trespass, theft or piracy. In patent terms, A steals B’s intellectual 
property by infringing. And theft does not only lead to welfare losses—
investments into detection, protection and correction, for instance. It is 
also a moral wrong.  
Fourth, the conventional remedy to solve holdout problems is a 
government taking. The State takes A’s property, and provides just 
compensation. In a taking, as opposed to a purchase, the amount 
received by owners is not determined by negotiation, but rather 
unilaterally by the State.117 In the patent field, the functional equivalent 
of a taking is a compulsory license: a court or agency suppresses the 
rights of a property owner, and sets a price for the license. 
At this stage, we want to stress that it is not speculative to believe 
that semantic deviations generate anchoring effects. All scholars, 
including ourselves, understand the power of issue framing and 
problem definition on decision makers. Dozens of political scientists 
have written on this issue.118 Philosophers have devoted numerous 
																																								 																				
 116. Note that even before eBay, no permanent injunction had ever been granted on the basis 
of an infringed SEP in the United States. After eBay, only one has been granted, and the U.S. 
Trade Representative has mandated its recall. 
 117. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 25, at 1688. 
 118. See William G. Jacoby, Issue Framing and Public Opinion on Government Spending, 
44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 750 (2000). See also Janet A. Weiss, The Powers of Problem Definition: The 
Case of Government Paperwork, 22 POL’Y SCI. 97 (1989); David A. Rochefort & Roger W. Cobb, 
Problem Definition: An Emerging Perspective, in 1 THE POLITICS OF PROBLEM DEFINITION: 
SHAPING THE POLICY AGENDA (1994); WILLIAM RIKER, THE ART OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION 
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studies to how Greek sophists used rhetoric to advance political 
platforms. Heterodox economists like Hayek have riled the use of 
“weasel words” to disguise intrusive market interference.119 
Environmentalists have also criticized the substitution of “climate 
change” to “global warming” in the 2000s, when the debate was closing 
in against the skeptics.120  
Yet, one issue remains unresolved: why has there been so little 
objection to the substitution of holdout by holdup in the patent 
literature? 
3.2 Terminology and the State of IP Economics 
Except for the works of Golden (and of Haber and Galetovic in 
relation to holdup), the semantic deviation described above has gone 
almost entirely unnoticed in the profession. One possible reason is that 
economists use non-standardized, though elegant, language that only 
economists can understand.121 Ian Ayres and Gideon Parchomovsky 
provide a good illustration, discussing the work of Shapiro in terms of 
holdout.122  
The problem, of course, is that economists are not only read by 
economists. This terminological accuracy matters when economic 
theories make their way towards law and policy. Lawyers, officials and 
judges who are accustomed to a strong degree of semantical discipline 
often take for granted that different words bear distinct meanings. In 
turn, the variance in qualifications in economics scholarship may drive 
non-economists into category errors if those accustomed to the ‘one 
word–one meaning’ norm draw irrelevant, unnecessary and/or 
superfluous distinctions amongst concepts. To be more concrete, the 
introduction of holdup as a new term of art may be understood as 
denoting a novel kind of market failure worthy of policy consideration, 
when in fact the phenomenon has been well-known for decades. 
This problem that we underline here may be particularly acute in 
relation to IP economics. Unlike other areas of the law such as antitrust, 
economic theory has generally received less attention in intellectual 
																																								 																				
(1986). 
 119. Friedrich August Hayek, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, in THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK 1, 116-17 (William W. Bartley III & Stephen 
Kresge eds., 2011).  
 120. See Terry Anderson & Kurt R. Leube, The Climate Of Word Change, HOOVER INST. 
(Mar. 8, 2017), http://bit.do/climate-of-word-change. 
 121. Another reason is that economists do not read law articles, much less read footnotes. 
 122. See Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent Rights, 60 STAN. L. REV. 863 
(2007). 
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property scholarship.123 This is particularly true of TCE or the theory 
of the firm. In turn, many concepts of IP economics are still in a state 
of flux and have not reached the analytical maturity observed in other 
areas. This generates a proliferation of concepts. Ron Katznelson and 
John Howells remark for instance that “[t]here is rich metaphorical 
vocabulary in the patent literature, describing patent litigation and 
“prohibitive” demands for royalties for licensing under key basic 
patents, which conveys essentially the same meaning as patent ‘hold-
up’ such as patent logjam, thicket, deadlock, gridlock and impasse.”124 
In the same vein, it may be worthwhile noting that a similar 
phenomenon has occurred with the term “patent troll,” often used as a 
synonym by IP writers to less loaded concepts like “patent dealers,” 
“patent-holding entity,” “non-practicing entity,” or “patent-assertion 
entity.”125 
Moreover, IP scholarship is generally not driven by descriptive 
ambition, and its current approach is generally normative.126  
3.3. Normative vs. Positive Economics  
In his Nobel Prize lecture, George Stigler explored why new ideas 
are accepted or rejected by a science.127 He suggested that “the 
attractiveness of the public policy positions associated with a theory 
has an effect upon the acceptability of the theory.”128 In the market for 
new ideas, those with substantial policy implications end up 
dominating epistemic communities. Thomas Piketty’s work on wealth 
inequality, with its clear implications for optimal taxation, is a stark 
example.129 
																																								 																				
 123. See Dan Burk, Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (2004) (noting 
this in relation to the theory of the firm). 
 124. See Ron Katznelson & John Howells, The Myth of the Early Aviation Patent Hold-Up 
– How a U.S. Government Monopsony Commandeered Pioneer Airplane Patents, 24 INDUS. & 
CORP. CHANGE 1 (2015). Similarly, Professor Robert Merges, an economics-savvy lawyer, 
discusses blocking conduct of a patent owner as holdup in 1994 and as holdout in 1996. Robert 
Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655 (1994); 
Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking 
Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994). See also Merges, supra note 32. 
 125. James F. McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the 
Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189 (2006) (defining trolls as 
“[a] person or entity who acquires ownership of a patent without the intention of actually using it 
to produce a product”). 
 126. Jonathan Barnett, Property as Process: How Innovation Markets Select Innovation 
Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384, 387 (2009) (discussing “the normative mode of most intellectual 
property scholarship”). 
 127. George Stigler, Nobel Lecture: The Process and Progress of Economics, 91 J. POL. 
ECON. 529, 529 (1983). 
 128. Id. at 543. 
 129. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer 
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A possible implication of Stigler’s intuition is that normative 
economic theories—those that explain how the world ought to be—are 
subject to less challenge (they are more acceptable in Stigler’s words) 
by law, policy makers and academics, than positive economic 
theories—those that describe how the world is. In turn, this could 
explain the greater influence of the normative patent holdup theory on 
decision makers, as compared to the descriptive theory of patent 
holdout. The patent holdup theory indeed comes with a battery of 
reform proposals. The policy paper advocates a relaxation of antitrust 
inhospitality vis-à-vis cooperative efforts by technology firms to bring 
licensing terms down. The interdisciplinary paper proposes a reform of 
the rules of reasonable damages calculation as well as a selective 
limitation of the award of injunctions by courts.130 And the antitrust 
paper proposes to rely on antitrust enforcement in order to “lim[it] 
royalties and other license terms to those that would have resulted had 
the patents been disclosed and licensing terms been bindingly 
negotiated ex ante.”131 In contrast, no such policy agenda comes with 
patent holdout. Even if patent holdout was brought to bear in policy 
reform, it would have less appeal: the idea of strengthening the “patent 
monopoly” or of encouraging patent litigation is likely a tough sell to 
law and policy makers, especially to antitrust agencies. 
3.4. The Conduct of Economics 
In a critique of the commonplace “holdup” explanation for the 
acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors, Ronald Coase noted that 
“the belief in the truth of a theory leads to a lack of interest in what 
actually happens is not uncommon in economics.”132 
Those impressed by patent holdup theory should be wary of not 
succumbing to the same reinforcement bias. In the literature supporting 
patent holdup, the discussion of injunction on FRAND-pledged SEPs 
as a new instantiation of “holdup” does not seem based on a careful 
empirical investigation, but instead displays what Coase may have 
called a rather “casual attitude toward checking the facts.”133 As we 
have already stressed, the literature supporting patent holdup dispenses 
																																								 																				
trans., Harv. Univ. Press 2014). 
 130. See Shapiro, supra note 3, at 308 (The economics paper advanced the same agenda, 
plus called on the courts “to grant stays on their injunctions, giving downstream firms time to 
redesign non-infringing versions of their products.”). 
 131. See Farrell et al., supra note 58, at 660.  
 132. Ronald Coase, The Conduct of Economics: The Example of Fisher Body and General 
Motors, 15 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 255, 275 (2006). 
 133. Id. 
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with explaining how the proposed theory can stand alive absent the 
basic conditions of opportunism and asset specificity.  
Moreover, the theory’s “early negotiations” scenario or “weak 
patent holdup theory” may not give enough credit to the reality of 
patent transactions. Recall that this variant of the theory suggests that 
there can be holdup when negotiations between the patent holder and 
the downstream firm occur and the latter has not yet designed its 
product. This is because the royalty rate that will be negotiated does 
not involve any discounting based on patent strength so that royalties 
are paid for weak patents. According to Lemley and Shapiro, there is 
“no such discounting because if licensing negotiations break down, the 
downstream firm will design its product to avoid infringing, which 
involves foregoing the use of the patented feature for sure, not merely 
in the event that the patent would be proven invalid.”134 However, this 
somewhat strong claim posits arbitrarily that the downstream firms will 
not make the argument of the patent’s probabilistic weakness to 
maximize their surplus. We would question why the downstream firm 
would forego a bargaining argument that can further decrease the 
royalty rate below the higher default point of redesign cost. Similarly, 
the statement that “[t]he downstream firm cannot adopt a strategy of 
“redesign only if the patent is valid” without exposing itself to holdup 
if the patent is valid is disingenuous because if there is a valid patent, 
then redesign will be ex-hypothesis complex. Moreover, the idea that 
there is overcompensation (holdup) is strange, because here the patent 
can be deemed strong.135  
Besides, the literature supporting patent holdup fails to 
contemplate that all patents are not homogeneously probabilistic. In 
this regard, the four papers pay no heed to whether there is (i) an 
endogenous threshold level of patent weakness at which “holdup” 
becomes problematic; and (ii) an exogenous set of factors that affect 
the probabilistic validity of a patent. For instance, it is widely known 
that the rate of patent invalidity is lower in the E.U. than in the U.S. 
Similarly, the fact that SSOs share their documentation with patent 
offices, such as the USPTO or the EPO or publish databases of SEPs 
(like ETSI or the IEEE), give rise to fewer patents being issued and in 
turn increases patent quality. 
A third aspect that lacks in factual backing is seen in the bold 
claim that patent holdup results in a loss of efficiency.136 The papers 
pretend that patent owners exact a tax on new products, which impedes 
																																								 																				
 134. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 2004-05. 
 135. Id. at 2005. 
 136. Klein et al., supra note 92, at 301. 
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rather than promotes innovation.137 Again, the emerging empirical 
scholarship on holdup and royalty stacking invalidates this conjecture, 
and no counter evidence has yet been advanced by the patent holdup 
scholars to corroborate their early conjectures.138 Instead, both Shapiro 
and Lemley have sought to double down by criticizing this emerging 
empirical literature as being “faith-based” or “myth.”139 
We do not pretend that patent holdup theory is disingenuous. It is 
a plausible problem at the theoretical level. We neither affirm that there 
is no empirical evidence of patent holdup. Some cases confirm its 
existence. Instead, our bottom line is that patent holdup is a thin theory. 
It abstracts away certain facts of the standard setting process, to 
describe two strict hypotheses which do not correspond to the 
specifications present in the real economic context of FRAND-pledged 
SEPs. In our opinion, the founders of patent holdup theory today face 
an important responsibility: recalling the limitations of their progeny. 
As Tirole himself wrote in his famous IO textbook: “At first sight, even 
a theorist should regret the very high ratio of theory to evidence in a 
field in which theoretical models are often lacking in generality and in 
which practical implications are so crucial.”140 
II. PATENT “TRESPASS”: DEFINITIONAL ISSUES 
Now that we have argued that holdout is not a suitable term to 
denote the conduct of an unlicensed implementer, we must come up 
with a distinct, better term. We face here a pragmatic problem: 
scientific fields are path dependent. It would thus be practically 
impossible to re-permute the terminologies. Moreover, this would 
leave wide open the question of how to call what we call now holdout, 
or reverse holdup.  
 As hinted above, we believe that an appropriate characterization 
may be patent “trespass.”141 As soon as we say this, however, we must 
concede the weaknesses of this choice. First, the concept of “trespass” 
has vernacular meaning in property law. It is a legal doctrine, subject 
to specific principles which may not fit with what we call patent 
“trespass.”142 Second, the concept of “trespass” is used as a “conceptual 
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 138. See Galetovic & Haber, supra note 90. 
 139. See Mark Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328 (2015). 
 140. JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 3 (John Bonin & Hélène 
Bonin trans., MIT Press 1988). 
 141. We are grateful to Steve Haber for pointing to this concept as a good substitute for 
“holdout.” 
 142. Trespass does not require a showing of harm, and one need not know that he is 
trespassing to commit a wrong. 
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analog” in relation to other policy issues in patent law, and it may thus 
be confusing to use it yet again here for other purposes.143 Third, 
scholars interested in the topic of patent holdup have proposed many 
semantical labels for holdout, and we have received several equally 
interesting suggestions from commenters including: “willful patent 
infringement,” “efficient infringement,” “adverse patent 
implementation,” “opportunistic infringement,” “patent-holder 
opportunism,” “implementer opportunism,” “deliberate patent 
trespass,” etc.  
While we concede that the choice of patent “trespass” in this paper 
has some downsides, we want to iron out some ambiguities. We use 
“trespass” to capture the casual idea that the product of a technology 
implementer involves a “relatively gross invasion” over a technology 
developer’s patent claims.144 Put differently, we no longer talk of patent 
“trespass” to describe the crossing of a legal “boundary.” We do not 
employ trespass as a doctrinal analogy, and the reader should therefore 
not attempt to draw parallels between what we call here trespass, and 
other areas, principles and rules of black letter law. This is in line with 
the law in context approach followed in the previous section, which 
tends to avoid being too legalistic.145 To further reduce confusion, we 
systematically refer to trespass in quotations (patent “trespass”). 
The reason which justifies our choice of “trespass,” as opposed to 
the other concepts proposed in the literature, is essentially one of 
balance. Given that both holdup and holdout are empirical issues, they 
ought not to be approached with any prior bias or prejudice. However, 
having followed the use of “patent holdup” as a reference term, the 
literature has created an imbalance. The only way to level the playing 
field is thus to use a metaphorically loaded term for the conduct of 
patent implementers, which neutralizes the bias against the conduct of 
patent owners.  
With this background, we attempt first to provide a definition of 
patent trespass, using prior works on what was until now called patent 
holdout in Section A. We then rely on the output of qualitative 
interviews to propose stylized examples of patent trespass in Section 
B. 
	  
																																								 																				
 143. Adam Mossoff, The Trespass Fallacy in Patent Law, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1687, 1687-88 
(2013). 
 144. Thomas Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 
14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 14 (1985). 
 145. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 94, at 4.  
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A. Patent Trespass: A Review 
The scholarship on patent trespass is scant, possibly because of 
the initial concept’s deviation from standard economic theory. At a 
general level, patent trespass can be said to arise when a SEP holder’s 
licensing revenue decreases, because some (or all) technology 
implementers avert, either temporarily or permanently, the conclusion 
of a licensing agreement on terms that correspond to recognized 
industry practices. Professor Golden refers to this as a “catch me if you 
can problem.”146  
Beyond this general definition, the literature documents many 
variants of patent trespass. A common form of trespass arises when 
willful SEP infringement remains undetected, and implementers wait 
to get sued.147 A related version of patent trespass occurs when detected 
infringers refuse or delay negotiation and/or payment.148 Patent 
trespass can also arise before courts, when infringing defendants resort 
to “diversionary tactics” in litigation.149 Technology implementers may 
attempt to challenge the validity and/or essentiality of the SEP as 
counterclaims before the same court,150 or as independent demands 
before other judicial forums. In this discussion, the limit between 
trespass and legitimate patent defenses—laches, estoppel151, equity and 
antitrust152—is not always entirely clear. Other studies are more 
outcome-spirited, and single out patent trespass in valuation terms. 
Langus, Lipatov, and Neven—who talk of “reverse holdup”—consider 
that patent trespass occurs when the proposed, negotiated or settled 
royalties lead to “below FRAND rates” or are “below the fair rate.” 
Lastly, some include in patent trespass the advocacy efforts deployed 
by technology implementers to weaken the enforceability of SEPs with 
																																								 																				
 146. See Golden, supra note 33, at 2135. 
 147. Edward Egan & David Teece, Untangling the Patent Thicket Literature 13 (Tusher Ctr. 
for Mgmt. of Intell. Capital, Working Paper No. 7, 2015). 
 148. Marie Barani, From Patent Hold-Up to Patent Hold-Out?, 14 INT’L J. 
STANDARDIZATION RES. 1, 7-9 (2016). For instance, they may insist on specific licensing terms, 
to put the SEP owner in breach of its duty of nondiscrimination under a FRAND commitment. 
See Letter from Sharon Israel, President, AIPLA, to the Japan Trade Comm’n (Aug. 6, 2015), 
http://bit.do/Israel-AIPLA-Letter. 
 149. Egan & Teece, supra note 147, at 12. 
 150. Ménière, supra note 9. 
 151. An estoppel defense exists when the patent owner has failed to declare patents that 
could be essential. Remaining silent when there is a duty to speak can constitute an actionable 
defense against a patentee suing for injunctive relief. 
 152. See Microsoft Mobile, Inc. v. Interdigital, Inc., No. 15-CV-723-RGA, 2016 WL 
146545, at *1-*5 (D. Del. Apr. 13, 2016) (discussing an illustration of an antitrust defense); 
Lichtman, supra note 36, at 5-6 (discussing an exposition of ordinary patent defenses).  
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SSOs, regulatory agencies and policy makers.153 Kieff and Layne 
Farrar talk of “using the courts or agencies to obtain better terms and 
conditions than could be achieved through good faith negotiations.”154 
Again, however, the threshold level between the fundamental right to 
petition government and patent trespass is unclear.155 
In the scholarship, the determinants of patent trespass are equally 
heterogeneous, yet even more elusive. Some scholars stress 
transactions costs, in the form of detection costs, negotiation costs and 
litigation costs, as a possible driver.156 In particular, the litigation time 
reduces the litigation payoff of the patent owner, as injunctions are less 
powerful.157 At the same time, it is entirely unclear why SEP owners 
would systematically face transaction costs disadvantages over 
technology implementers.158  
SEP owners may also be undercompensated—a by-product of 
patent trespass—when there is “uncertain detection.”159 Yet, what 
causes uncertain detection is not discussed in the literature.  
A firm’s organizational structure, size, or reputation is said to 
expose it to higher risks of patent trespass.160 For instance, small firms, 
																																								 																				
 153. See Gregory Sidak, Patent Holdup and Oligopsonistic Collusion in Standard-setting 
Organizations, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 123 (2009); Kieff & Layne-Farrar, supra note 6, at 
1098-1100. 
 154. Kieff & Layne-Farrar, supra note 6, at 1114. 
 155. As an example, there is disagreement as to whether courts can fairly adjudicate 
damages in the SEP context and the impact on private negotiations in the shadow of the court. See 
William F. Lee & A. Douglas Melamed, Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Patent Damages, 101 
CORNELL L. REV. 385, 411-32 (2015) (describing why current reasonable royalty law 
 overcompensates patent holders by  contaminating the hypothetical negotiation  with ex post 
considerations).  But see Gregory J. Sidak, The Meaning of F/RAND, Part I: Royalties, 9 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 931, 983 (2013) (criticizing that the ex-ante evaluation of SEPs is ”not 
ex ante enough” and should be placed at the time of the R&D investment decision not the decision 
by the SSO); David J. Teece & Edward F. Sherry, The IEEE’s New IPR Policy: Did the IEEE 
Shoot Itself in the Foot and Harm Innovation? 6 (Tusher Ctr. for Mgmt. of Intell. Capital, 
Working Paper No. 13, 2016) (stating the recent inclusion of ex ante valuation of SEPs in the new 
IEEE IPR policy “essentially amounts to the proposition that all of the gains from standardization 
should flow to implementers and/or consumers, and none (except via the volume effect) to patent 
holders whose technology is incorporated into the standard” (emphasis original)).  
 156. Epstein et al., supra note 41, at 27 (“The situation is difficult enough if the patentee is 
in a position to identify and pursue, often at great cost, the large number of infringers. But these 
assumptions ignore the high costs in the detection and enforcement of these rights . . . .”). 
 157. Gregor Langus, Vilen Lipatov, & Damien Neven, Standard-Essential Patents: Who Is 
Really Holding Up (and When)?, 9 J. COMPETITION L. ECON. 253, 268 (2013).  
 158. There exists an incentive to delay borne out by the preliminary empirical evidence, but 
we would need greater access to the strategic logic of implementing firms to formulate a complete, 
explanatory factual theory. 
 159. Vincenzo Denicolò, Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar, & Jorge Padilla, Revisiting 
Injunctive Relief: Interpreting eBay in High-Tech Industries with Non-Practicing Patent Holders, 
4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 571, 591-92 (2008). 
 160. Chien, supra note 10, at 24, 31. 
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new entrants or pure innovators who cannot leverage a reputation effect 
may be at risk.161 Similarly, some claim that the “relative size of the 
infringer as compared to the patentee” may play a role, entitling big 
implementers to resist claims of legitimate compensation vindicated by 
small developers.162 But, a plausible counter-argument is that when the 
implementer is small relative to the SEP owner, the later may renege 
on lost licensing revenue in particular if transaction costs are high.  
The risk of adverse effects and asymmetrical stakes is often 
advanced as a source of patent trespass. An SEP owner who decides to 
assert SEPs against an unlicensed implementer brings himself under 
the risk of patent invalidation before the court where the case is 
litigated or before other forums (patent offices, etc.).163 Even if the 
patent is not invalidated, the court may offer an original reading of the 
patent in suit, and exclude certain acts of implementation of 
infringement.  
Beyond all those factors, one area of relative consensus is that 
limitations to the availability of injunctive relief—categorically or 
discretely164—contribute to the formation of patent trespass.165 
Consider an extreme case where injunctive relief is off the table. 
Assume that the maximum liability faced by a SEP infringer is 
compensatory damages capped on the outcome of a hypothetical ex-
ante negotiation. In this setting, technology implementers have no 
incentives whatsoever to enter into a license agreement.166 At best, their 
infringement will go unnoticed, or it will be belatedly detected by the 
SEP owner. At worst, they will be sued. But over the lifetime of the 
lawsuit, many contingencies occur, and they may be better off “tak[ing] 
																																								 																				
 161. Patents and Standards: A Modern Framework for IPR-based Standardization, at 124 
(Mar. 25, 2014), http://bit.do/patandstandards (“Small, financially constrained innovators or new 
entrants that cannot leverage a “reputation effect” are thus particularly at risk among SEP 
owners.”). 
 162. Chien, supra note 10, at 24. 
 163. Id. at 24-25. 
 164. See Fiona Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Patent Assertions: Are We Any Closer to 
Aligning Reward to Contribution? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21678, 
2015) (for an example of a proposal to categorically restrict injunctions). 
 165. Certain 3G Mobile Handsets and Certain Wireless Devices with 3G and/or 4G 
Capabilities, Inv. No. 337-TA-868 (June 13, 2014) (Initial Determination) (noting that elimination 
of injunctive relief would only incentivize patent holdout).  
 166. Kieff & Layne-Farrar, supra note 6, at 1113 (arguing against a categorical rule limiting 
injunctions when a FRAND commitment has been given: “[f]or example, interpreting a RAND 
commitment as preventing patent holders from ever seeking an injunction would overlook the 
dynamic impact it would have on incentives for putative licensees to take a license up front. More 
specifically, infringers would rationally consider the benefits of simply avoiding any up front 
offer to take a license on any terms, RAND or not, knowing that on the back end they will not 
have to face an injunction for any patent that makes its way into any RAND commitment from 
within an SSO.”). 
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their chance” in court.167 Risk aversion, litigation fatigue or some 
factors previously outlined may cause an SEP owner to enter into a 
favorable settlement. In the worst-case scenario, the technology 
implementer will fully pay for compensatory damages, and this will be 
akin to a deferred payment (possibly inflated by the plaintiffs’ lawyers 
fees outside of the U.S.).168 Camesasca, Langus, Neven, and Treacy 
note that denying injunctions gives prospective licensees “enhanced 
ability and incentives to free ride on SEPs.”169  
Virtually all authors agree that injunctions seek to promote the 
conclusion of licensing contracts when technology is relevant.170 
Restricting their availability may be particularly conducive to trespass 
in relation to technologies subject to rapid life cycles, such as wireless 
communications.  
More generally, this idea ties the concept of “efficient 
infringement” mentioned previously.171 Yet, the concept of efficient 
infringement is potentially misleading for the following reason: the fact 
that an infringement is efficient from the individual perspective of an 
SEP implementer does not imply that the infringement is efficient from 
a social perspective. To take an analogous example, a cartel is an 
efficient infringement from each cartelist’s individual perspective, yet 
this does not make the cartel efficient at the social level. An 
infringement may be efficient, and at the same time give rise to a 
market failure that warrants remediation through private or public 
ordering.172 
Anecdotal examples of trespassing exist. An illustrative case is 
provided by the LTE standard. In 2012, Via Licensing and Sisvel 
created two patent pools covering nearly 1000 SEPs. Yet, in 2016 none 
																																								 																				
 167. Geradin, supra note 5, at 125. 
 168. Joe Kattan & Chris Wood, Standard-Essential Patents and the Problem of Hold-Up 15 
(Dec. 19, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://bit.do/Kattan-Std-Essential. 
 169. Peter Camesasca, Gregor Langus, Damien Neven, & Pat Treacy, Injunctions for 
Standard-Essential Patents: Justice Is Not Blind, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 285, 287 (2013). 
 170. Epstein et al., supra note 41, at 4 (discussing injunctions as a common remedy in patent 
law: “[t]he combined effect of this approach to patent remedies is that parties in the patent 
marketplace are encouraged to contract with each other before or during the time frame in which 
the patented technology was put to significant use”). 
 171. In brief, without injunctive relief, there is no downside to infringement.  
 172. This distinction between a socially versus individually efficient infringement is what 
fuels the scholarly discussion on the availability of enhanced damages for willful infringement. 
Aware of that problem, Judge Gilstrap noted that “it would be inappropriate to create a bright line 
rule forbidding enhanced damages merely because the asserted patents are standard essential.” 
Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc., Nos. 2:14-cv-00911, 2:14-cv-00912, 2016 
WL 4596118 at *2 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2016) (order denying motion for summary judgment of no 
willful infringement). 
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of those companies had signed a single license.173 Other examples of 
trespassing conduct were reported in several jurisdictions: U.S.,174 
E.U.,175 India, and Brazil.176 Beyond those individual occurrences of 
patent trespass, a more obscure question concerns the overall welfare 
impact of patent trespass. Much of the abovementioned scholarship 
makes the qualitative point that patent trespass is likely to affect 
technology developers’ incentives to both contribute to SSOs and make 
long term innovation investments.177 However, only few studies have 
formally or empirically studied the adverse economic effects of patent 
trespass. Langus, Lipatov, and Neven find that reverse hold up 
(royalties below the fair rate) may arise in equilibrium even when 
injunctions are systematically granted, but they do not associate any 
welfare estimate to that effect.178 Ganglmair, Froeb, and Werden 
explain that when licensing negotiations occur after the innovator’s 
investment in R&D is sunk but before the implementer sinks its 
investment in the standard, any reduction in the availability of 
injunctive relief “reduce[s] the payoff from R&D and makes some 
projects no longer worth pursuing.”179 
B. Patent Trespass Strategies 
1. General Properties of Patent Trespass Strategies 
At a general level, patent trespass occurs when a firm practices a 
patented technology, a SEP in the context of this paper, yet refuses to 
take a license. Our sample of interviews highlights several specificities 
of patent trespass (note that our respondents were interviewed on 
“holdout,” but for the reasons previously explained, we document our 
																																								 																				
 173. Arvin Patel, Time to Save Standards, INTELL. ASSET MGMT., Nov.-Dec. 2016, at 56. 
 174. Daryl Lim, Patent Holdups, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND HIGH TECH (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2017).  
 175. See Peter Picht, The ECJ Rules on Standard-Essential Patents: Thoughts and Issues 
Post-Huawei, 37 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 365 (2016) (reporting on German cases illustrative 
of holdout conduct). 
 176. Barani, supra note 148, at 9. 
 177. Denicolò et al., supra note 159, at 603-04 (“The main point here is how the granting of 
an injunction would affect incentives for innovation. Although in the short-term limiting 
injunctions may protect the investments of manufacturing firms, long-term innovation might be 
chilled. In particular, if injunctions are granted on the basis of whether the patent holder actually 
practices its invention or whether the product incorporates multiple patented inventions, the 
viability of a worthy business model would be hindered and incentives for innovation would be 
reduced. For all of these reasons, we agree with the majority opinion in the eBay decision: 
categorical limits on injunctive relief are not needed and could do much harm.”).  
 178. Langus et al., supra note 157, at 258. 
 179. In other words, fewer socially-beneficial R&D projects are undertaken. See Ganglmair 
et al., supra note 13, at 265-66. 
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results in terms of trespass). First, patent trespass is intentional. As 
mentioned by one respondent, patent trespass is a situation that 
develops after an SEP holder writes to a company to say there are actual 
or future infringements. A firm that trespasses must knowingly practice 
a patented technology. Patent trespass can therefore be distinguished 
from inadvertent patent infringement and the customary vetting 
process required to ascertain essentiality and validity in patent disputes 
is undertaken without the specific purpose to delay, as discussed below.  
Second, while patent trespass consists in a refusal to take a 
proposed license, or in attempts to avert an invitation to license, it often 
manifests itself through less explicit strategies. Some scholars talk of a 
“constructive” refusal to take a license. In line with this, most 
respondents insist that patent trespass is essentially about seeking to 
delay the initiation or progression of licensing negotiation with the goal 
of eliminating or reducing the amount of royalties paid to the SEP 
holder. Given that licensing negotiations and litigation can take many 
years, the combination of direct costs and the uncertainty of judicial 
outcomes favors a strategy of delay on behalf of the SEP implementer 
in the absence of accessible injunctive relief.  
Third, even if the patent owner can successfully claim 
compensatory damages with interest rates, patent trespass is not simply 
akin to a deferred payment. The reasons for this are diverse. One is that 
interest rates are lost on the pre-negotiation period. Another reason is 
that interest rates are generally much lower than internal rates of 
return.180 Lastly, an important consideration is that, depending on the 
legal fees rules, the patent owner may bear some (or all) of the costs of 
litigation.181 At the extreme, if delaying tactics work to their full extent, 
																																								 																				
 180. It should be noted that the delay of payment calculated at the internal rate of return of 
both the SEP licensor and licensee can be quite substantial for both parties. For example, a 
licensee that is ordered by a court to pay interest for back payments at a risk-free rate could save 
over 10% compounded annually over the time of the delay in relation to its actual cost of capital. 
A report by consulting economists Pierre Régibeau, Raphaël De Coninck, and Hans Zenger seems 
to deny, however, the general validity of the argument:  
The first concern is that SEP-holders are prevented by hold-out strategies from 
obtaining a market return from their investment in innovation . . . Economically 
this argument is not generally valid … Delayed payment can only matter for the 
innovator when there are financial market imperfections that increase the costs of 
financing investment when the royalty income stream is reduced. For financially 
constrained entities, the failure to collect royalties promptly may have the effect of 
preventing further research because the costs of financing increase with lower cash 
flows.  
See Pierre Régibeau, Raphaël De Coninck & Hans Zenger, Transparency, Predictability, and 
Efficiency of SSO-based Standardization and SEP Licensing, at 20-21 (Dec. 12, 2016), 
http://bit.do/Regibeau-Transparency.  
 181. In Europe, most jurisdictions apply a form of the “loser pays” principle which may 
disincentivize litigation by the SEP owner. In the United States, a regime more favorable to 
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even the prospect of getting compensatory damages from a court may 
become uncertain, for instance when the patent approaches its 
expiration or when the standard has been phased out and replaced by a 
new generation.182  
Fourth, most respondents agree there is some symmetry between 
patent holdup and trespass. A patent holdup requires the availability of  
injunctive, otherwise there is no compulsion to pay supra-FRAND 
rates. In contrast, patent trespass exists when injunctive relief is not 
available, potentially leading to the compulsion to settle on sub-
FRAND rates. Most respondents explain that patent trespass can occur 
even where injunctive relief is available (whereas patent holdup cannot 
occur when injunctive relief is not available). This may be due to the 
fact that the transaction costs of litigating for an injunction can be 
prohibitively high as compared to the value of the case.183 In particular, 
when implementing firms are small and medium-sized enterprises 
(“SMEs”), they may represent too little revenue for an SEP owner as 
compared to the transaction costs of seeking a license (for instance, 
there are thousands of small consumer electronic firms that implement 
WiFi standards). Implementing firms that know this can deliberately 
holdout from licensing negotiations.184  
Fifth, trespassing firms may pursue strategic goals that go beyond 
pure revenue sharing. Trespassing firms competing in the product 
market that eschew licensing payments can sell their products at lower 
prices and outcompete rivals who have taken licenses and paid 
royalties. This allows trespassing firms to capture greater profits or 
market share. It also disincentivizes any firm from taking a license 
unless the whole market is licensed, which creates a collective action 
problem. In concrete terms, trespassing firms compete to be last to pay.  
																																								 																				
litigation exists. 
 182. Respondents give this as a reason why many smaller SEP holders often do not attempt 
to collect royalties or employ patent assertion entities (“PAEs”) to handle the collection. 
 183. See Chien, supra note 10, at 5, 20 (noting “[t]he practice of companies ignoring patents 
and patent demands because the high costs of enforcing patents makes prosecution unlikely” or 
the “practice of companies routinely ignoring patents and resisting patent demands because the 
odds of getting caught are small”). 
 184. This is analogous to patent holdup when a PAE makes a license offer at a level below 
initial costs of due diligence in litigation. 
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Figure 1 illustrates the decision process for delay from the 
perspective of the SEP implementer based on the proposed elements of 
patent trespass defined above.185 The model depicts an initial offer 
(FRAND1) at (point 0) after which a reasonable due diligence phase is 
initiated followed by the decision to accept or delay (point 1). 186 If 
delay is chosen, this strategy continues until a settlement is agreed upon 
(FRAND2) or a final court decision is adjudicated (FRAND3).187 When 
FRAND3 ≤ FRAND2 ≤ FRAND1 is perceived as true, delay and 
litigation will be preferred over payment until the point when the 
certainty of the outcome (e.g., in relation to court decision) makes 
settlement a better financial choice than delay.188 Under this model of 
behavior, the SEP holder will automatically face a reduction in their 
																																								 																				
 185. The model is based on the general theory that negotiations are done in the shadow of 
the current perceived norms of the court (and other relevant regulators and policy actors). Thus, 
implementers will delay to avoid payment not because the technology they are using is not 
valuable, but because the current legal/regulatory/policy environment incentivizes this behavior 
from a financial perspective (i.e., when it is economically rational). 
 186. There can of course be different stages of delay in negotiation and litigation, including 
appeal. However, the reasonable time required to vet validity, infringement, and essentiality is 
not considered to be deliberate delay in the model. 
 187. At the time of the initial decision (point 1 in Figure 1), a rational SEP implementer will 
evaluate the potential time value of delay, the potential value of a favorable court decision, the 
potential value of the SEP holder giving up, and the potential costs associated with the delay and 
litigation.  
 188. For example, patent damages under U.S. law are typically determined using a 
reasonable royalty standard. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood 
Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Thus, it is not likely that a court-determined 
FRAND rate would exceed the initial FRAND offer made by the SEP holder. This has been shown 
to be true in recent U.S. FRAND cases. See Bowman Heiden, Valuing Standard Essential Patents 
in the Knowledge Economy: A Comparison of F/RAND Royalty Methodologies in U.S. Courts, 13 
INT’L J. STANDARDIZATION RES. 19 (2015). 
Figure 1: Patent Trespass Decision Model 
2017] PATENT “TRESPASS” & THE ROYALTY GAP 219 
initial offer (FRAND1) by the costs associated with delay and litigation, 
as well as the time value of money and the probability of success in 
court. In essence, a potential SEP implementer is indemnified against 
a FRAND royalty payment up to the amount of these transaction costs. 
As the difficulty of litigation increases (for example, in jurisdictions 
where patents are more difficult to enforce), the value of patent trespass 
increases. Thus, this model suggests that the value of patent trespass 
strategies will vary across different geographical jurisdictions, 
producing a portfolio of decision models depending on the geography 
of current and future markets.189 
In conclusion, given that licensing negotiations and litigation can 
take many years, the combination of direct costs and the time value of 
money can erect transaction cost barriers that block or at least diminish 
SEP holders’ ability to collect reasonable royalties. In addition, the 
result of patent litigation is uncertain due to the probabilistic nature of 
patents,190 which could result in the finding of very low or no royalties 
depending on the jurisdiction. Moreover, the erosion of patent value, 
possibly due to novel valuation theories deployed by courts around the 
world, may incentivize implementers to remain silent in the face of 
licensing demands.191 Finally, in relation to licensed actors on the 
market, SEP implementers benefit from delay through improved 
competitive positioning. Without the availability of injunctive relief, 
all of these factors benefit the potential licensee and incentivize delay 
indefinitely, which effectively provides the SEP implementer with a 
low-cost option to wait.192 The situation is exacerbated when there are 
multiple implementers, as each implementer is incentivized to trespass 
the longest (i.e., be the last to be sued and pay as little rent accruing to 
the SEP owner). This maximizes their competitive advantage relative 
to their competing implementing firms. The “race to trespass” effect 
becomes especially true for technology implementers with low margins 
competing on cost advantage strategies. 
2. Stylized Examples of Patent Trespass Strategies 
Let us now turn to some instantiations of patent trespass garnered 
during our qualitative interviews. At this stage of our research, we can 
																																								 																				
 189. For example, the duration, the amount and payer of court costs, and the determination 
of patent damages are all variables that can differ greatly across jurisdictions. The impact of these 
differences is apparent from the strategies deployed by global firms to choose their legal 
jurisdictions for dispute resolution. 
 190. See Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75 (2005). 
 191. Renaud et al., supra note 7, at 62. 
 192. The strategy of delay in patent holdout can be modeled as a call option where the SEP 
implementer has the right—but not the obligation—to purchase a license from the SEP holder. 
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document four interesting types of delaying tactics. First, the 
trespassing firm may offer negotiation terms that are not industry 
practice, whereby:  
• the SEP implementer insists to discuss a license on a 
patent-by-patent basis, where portfolio licensing is the 
industry norm;  
• the SEP implementer requests a country specific license, 
whilst the technology is the same worldwide and it is a 
Multi-National Corporation (“MNC”); and/or 
• the SEP implementer constantly postpones negotiation 
meetings or sends a corporate envoy with no authority to 
conclude a licensing agreement.193 
Similarly, a second trespass strategy can occur in relation to 
litigation/arbitration strategy. For instance, the trespassing firm may 
agree to third-party determination through arbitration, but take steps to 
delay the process by endlessly debating over specifications. Such 
specifications can include the choice of the place of arbitration, the 
appointment or arbitrators, the number of arbitrators, etc.  
A third possible, and more controversial, example of trespass 
occurs when infringers take affirmative steps to weaken the SEP 
holder’s position. This can occur by starting invalidity proceedings 
before courts and patent offices, initiating antitrust complaints with 
competition agencies, and vindicating changes to patent policies before 
Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs).194 Whilst the literature is not 
always clear on the circumstances in which the mere exercise of the 
right to litigation and petition is akin to trespass, we believe that certain 
extreme tactics constitute obvious examples. For instance, there is 
trespass when the implementer divides a case relating to one portfolio 
license in a myriad of invalidity cases before distinct jurisdictions. 
Lastly, within their corporate organization, some trespassing 
firms have set up “licensing-in” departments. Their job is to avoid 
paying anything for patent implementation, including “licensing-in 
litigation groups” whose purpose is to litigate against patent holders. 
Certainly, legitimate arguments can be made by SEP 
implementers regarding the strategies involving issues fundamental to 
																																								 																				
 193. Multiple versions of delay in negotiations are put forward by interviewees and survey 
respondents including, for example, corporate restructuring, changing contact persons on a regular 
basis, pretending to be close to deal and then changing opinion, requiring excessive amounts of 
detailed information, and delaying court proceedings. 
 194. See Intex Techs. (India) Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, Case No. 76/2013, 
Competition Commission of India (Jan. 16, 2014) (illustrating these tactics); INST. OF ELEC. & 
ELECS. ENG’RS, IEEE STANDARDS BOARD BYLAWS, at § 6 (Dec. 2016), http://bit.do/IEEE-
StdsBdBylaws (demonstrating the recent IEEE IPR patent policy change). 
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patent law. The main question then becomes: at what point does a 
willing licensee, reasonably conducting due diligence and price 
negotiation, transition into an unwilling licensee, participating in a 
deliberate strategy of delay with the primary intention to reduce or 
avoid completely its FRAND royalty obligation? A framework to 
answer this question and determine the economic impact is discussed 
below. 
3. Case Law 
A review of recent court cases provides dispositive or suggestive 
evidence of what may constitute holdout conduct.195 Hereafter, we 
discuss cases that expressly found that an infringer was “unwilling” to 
conclude a license on FRAND terms. Our sample of cases also includes 
cases where the examiner of facts did not reach a finding of 
unwillingness to license, but whose facts provide anecdotal illustration 
of trespass.  
A first strand of cases features licensees who either stay entirely 
silent to invitations from SEP holders to enter into licensing 
discussions or who delay the progression of negotiations. In Saint 
Lawrence Communications v. Deutsche Telekom and HTC, for 
instance, an infringer had not replied for 5 months to an invitation to 
license by a SEP owner. In line with other courts, this time period was 
sufficient for the German court to deem the infringer “undisputedly not 
willing” to license and to grant the injunction.196 Besides this relatively 
standard threshold duration,197 more extreme delays are also reported 
in the case-law. For instance, in NTT DoCoMo v. HTC, an implementer 
had only submitted a counter offer a year and a half after having 
received the licensing invitation, and a half year after the initiation of 
infringement proceedings.198 Similarly, in Sisvel v. Haier, the infringer 
																																								 																				
 195. To conduct this overview of case law, we have made extensive use of Peter Georg 
Picht, Case Law Search: A Summary of Post-Huawei Court Decisions, 4IP COUNCIL (June 6, 
2017), http://bit.do/post-Huawei.  
 196. Landesgericht Mannheim [LG] [Regional Court Mannheim], Mar. 10, 2015, Case No. 
2 O 103/14 (Ger.), http://bit.do/LGMannheim-caseno2O103-14. See Bucharest Court of Appeal 
4th Civil Division, Oct. 28, 2015, Case No. 29437/3/2015 (“After informing Defendant, on 25 
September 2012, about its SEP portfolio and inviting it to indicate its interest in obtaining a global 
license, Claimant submitted, on 28 March 2013, a licensing offer (inter alia) for the patent-in-suit. 
Defendant did not respond to Claimant’s communications.”). See also Picht, supra note 195, for 
details made available in a survey. 
 197. Landesgericht Düsseldorf [LG] [Regional Court Düsseldorf], Mar. 31, 2016, Case No. 
4a O 73/14 (Ger.), summarized in Picht, supra note 195 (“Defendant did not comply with Huawei 
because it took more than five months to react and then only asked for proof of the alleged 
infringement.”). 
 198. Landesgericht Mannheim [LG] [Regional Court Mannheim], Jan. 29, 2016, Case No. 
7 O 66/15 (Ger.), summarized in Picht, supra note 195 (“In casu the standard implementer’s 
222 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.  [Vol. 34 
took seven months to reject the offers presented by the SEP owner, and 
subsequently waited almost a year to submit a counter offer.199 These 
cases suggest that the length of reply taken by the infringer is the 
dispositive fact that permits an inference of an intention to evade a 
license. Yet, some cases are more explicit. In TCT v Ericsson, the 
antitrust agency of Brazil noted that the infringer appeared engaged in 
intentionally delaying such an agreement.200 
A second group of cases displays an infringer entering into 
licensing discussions, yet on the basis of extreme negotiation terms. 
Archos S.A. v. Koninklijke Philips N.V., a case over the entire Philips 
patent portfolio relating to the UMTS (3G) and LTE (4G) standards, 
provides a telling example. Here the alleged infringer had started 
negotiation indicating that if the SEP owner “wanted more than a few 
thousands of euros it would have to take legal action.”201 Other cases 
feature an insistence to discuss contractual terms that deviate from 
established industry practice. For example, in Pioneer v Acer, the 
defendant counter offer was “evidently non-FRAND” because the 
license would have been limited to Germany whilst it was “recognized 
commercial practice” in the field to discuss worldwide licenses.202 
A third instantiation of trespass consists in an infringer’s denial of 
infringement, despite clear evidence to the contrary. In Core Wireless 
v. LG Electronics, LG had sought to challenge Core Wireless’s lawsuit 
by raising an invalidity defense.203 However, LG’s corporate 
representative later testified before the Court that the patents were 
novel and non-obvious. Judge Gilstrap held that LG’s “invalidity 
defense, which was asserted at trial but rejected by the jury, is belied 
by the admission of LG’s corporate representative . . . who testified at 
his deposition that after thorough review of the patents-in-suit he 
																																								 																				
reaction was insufficient (1) because a counter-offer was made only 1.5 years after receiving the 
licensing offer and 0.5 years after the bringing of the proprietor’s action, (2) because security was 
merely promised, not provided, and (3) because the amount of security offered fell short of the 
court’s suggestions.”). 
 199. Landesgericht Düsseldorf [LG] [Regional Court Düsseldorf], Nov. 3, 2015, Case No. 
4a O 93/14 (Ger.), summarized in Picht, supra note 195, (“Defendants did not comply with this 
prerequisite because they rejected, on 1 September 2014, the offers presented by Claimant on 17 
February and 29 August 2014 without formulating any counter-offer, submitting such a counter-
offer only belatedly, on 12 August 2015.”). 
 200. See TCT Mobile Telefones v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, Decision on 
Preparatory Proceeding No. 08700.008409/2014-00, 08.06.2015 (Braz.).  
 201. RBDHA, 10 februari 2017, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:1025 (Archos S.A./Koninklijke 
Philips N.V.), summarized in Picht, supra note 195. 
 202. Landesgericht Mannheim [LG] [Regional Court Mannheim], Jan. 8, 2016, Case No. 7 
O 96/14 (Ger.), summarized in Picht, supra note 195. 
 203. Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 2:14-cv-00912 slip op. at 2 
(E.D. Tex. Nov. 1, 2016) (final judgment). 
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concluded that the patents are novel and non-obvious.” He further 
stated that “a factfinder could credit this evidence and conclude that 
LG willfully or wrongfully took steps to conceal infringement.”204  
Similarly, in Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v. Intex Techs., the 
facts featured a defendant infringer who argued that it was not aware 
of “any significant portfolio of [Ericsson’s] patents in India that are 
essential for compliance.”205 Yet, Ericsson countered that the defendant 
had filed several complaints before the Competition Commission of 
India and the Intellectual Property Appellate Board, thereby implicitly 
acquiescing that Ericsson’s patents were essential to the 2G and 3G 
standards. 
Lastly, other varieties of implementer practices may be deemed 
circumstantially constitutive of holdout. In IWNComm v. Sony, the 
Beijing Intellectual Property Court (BIPC) granted a permanent 
injunction against Sony in relation to the WAPI standard.206 The court 
found that the SEP owner had explained the patented technology 
relevant to WAPI and provided a list of its patent and a draft license 
agreement. In turn, the court considered that the defendant’s request 
for the plaintiff to provide a “claim chart” was unreasonable.207  
Core Wireless v. LG provides a tell-tale example of obstructive 
conduct constitutive of holdout.208 The court explained that extant 
negotiations had taken place, including seven meetings in Seoul. When 
LG invited Core Wireless to South Korea for a last meeting with a view 
to making a licensing offer, Core Wireless could reasonably expect to 
leave with expectations of a forthcoming license. Instead LG issued at 
that meeting a one-page document indicating that it preferred litigation, 
and that it would wait until another “major cell phone manufacturer 
licensed the portfolio” to be a “follower” in the pre-established royalty 
scheme. Finding LG unwilling to conclude a license, the court 
somewhat ironically noted that “this should have been done by email.” 
																																								 																				
 204. See Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc., Nos. 2:14-cv-00911, 2:14-
cv-00912, 2016 WL 4596118 at *2 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2016) (order denying motion for summary 
judgment of no willful infringement). 
 205. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v. Intex Techs. Ltd., I.A. No. 6735/2014 In Cs(Os) 
No. 1045/2014, Mar. 13, 2015 (India), available at http://bit.do/Ericsson-v-Intex. 
 206. Xin’t think caJie Tong Radio Network Co. v. Sony Mobile Communication (China) 
Co., Ltd. (西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司 v. 索尼移动通信产品（中国）有限公
司) [IWNComm. v. Sony], Jing Zhi Min Chu Zi No. 1194 (Beijing Intellectual Property Court 
2017) (China). For further information, see Dazheng David Huang, Beijing Intellectual Property 
Court Grants First Injunction in a SEP Infringement Suit, LINKEDIN (Mar. 22, 2017), 
http://bit.do/Beijing-IP-Ct-Grants-Injunction. 
 207. And that the plaintiff’s insistence on the signature of a non-disclosure agreement was 
not disproportionate, given the confidential information that appears in claim charts. 
 208. See Core Wireless, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 1, 2016) (final judgment). 
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The facts of Microsoft v. Motorola are also suggestive of patent 
trespass. True that in this case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit denied the injunction, and concluded that the SEP owner had 
breached a contractual duty.209 However, the facts of the case display 
features of a possible holdout strategy: during the proceedings, 
Microsoft had relocated its distribution center for all Windows and 
Xbox products for Germany to the Netherlands to protect itself against 
the economic loss if the German court were to find an infringement.210 
Lastly, in Wiko v. Sisvel, a SEP owner had addressed licensing 
invitations to retailers of telephones produced by unlicensed 
manufacturers. In response, one of the unlicensed implementers 
initiated unfair competition proceedings against the SEP owner. The 
undergirding allegation was that the letters sent to the resellers 
constituted illicit denigration because it claimed the products had been 
unlawfully manufactured. The Commercial Court dismissed the 
application.211 
III. DETERMINANTS OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL, SYSTEMATIC, AND 
SYSTEMIC PATENT TRESPASS 
In economic theory, holdup (holdout in mainstream economics) 
and trespass are traditionally perceived as circumstantial problems, and 
no obvious reason seems to justify a different treatment for patent 
holdup and patent trespass. However, the claims that patent holdup can 
evolve into royalty stacking and degrade innovation incentives 
logically invites a discussion on whether and how some factors can 
symmetrically turn circumstantial patent trespass into a systematic and 
systemic issue. We first define what we mean by circumstantial, 
systematic and systemic patent trespass in Section A and then discuss 
a few “plus factors” that can influence such outcomes in Section B. 
A. Framework 
At a quantum level, patent trespass is a circumstantial problem. In 
classic economic terms, patent trespass is a situation in which two firms 
are trying “to divide up the pie” through “tough negotiations.”212 Egan 
and Teece refer to this in the patent world as a simple case of “transfer 
payments,”213 meaning that SEP owners and implementers attempt to 
																																								 																				
 209. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 210. Id.  
 211. See Tribunal de Commerce [Trib. com.] [Commercial Court] Marseille, Sept. 20, 2016, 
[2016F01637] (Fr.). 
 212. Cohen, supra note 40, at 358-59. 
 213. Egan & Teece, supra note 147, at 12. 
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share economic surplus. When these negotiations and transfer 
payments become structured into market norms, one group of actors 
may hold a consistent, predominant and recurrent bargaining position 
over other market actors. In this case, the sharing of economic surplus 
no longer occurs at a discrete level, and can be described as systematic. 
Certainly, circumstantial and systematic bargaining power can have an 
impact on the performance of market actors. However, the economic 
significance of a circumstantial and systematic problem is primarily 
distributional. It is inapt to force firms to reallocate their resources to 
other markets. Short of such a deadweight loss, it does not have an 
impact on economic efficiency and aggregate welfare, and as such, is 
not a reason for policy intervention as the only issue is one of rent 
distribution between private actors.214 To continue the analogy above, 
only when the quality or the size of the “pie” is affected is the impact 
of bargaining power considered systemic. In this regard, circumstantial, 
systematic, and systemic market impact is as different degrees on the 
bargaining power spectrum, as shown below in Figure 2. 
We now turn to the question of whether patent trespass can yield 
systematic and systemic effects similar in nature to those associated to 
patent holdup. 
Professors Shapiro and Lemley point out the potential systematic 
dimension of the patent holdup problem as “a simple problem of 
arithmetic” the problem of patent holdup is magnified when “a single 
product potentially infringes on many patents, and thus may bear 
multiple royalty.”215 This is because, from the perspective of the patent 
user, all the “different claims for royalties must be . . . stacked together 
to determine the total royalty burden.”216 With this background—and 
some paraphrasing—systematic patent trespass can thus be defined as 
the situation in which a single SEP is potentially infringed by many 
users, and may thus forbear multiple royalty. In turn, from the 
perspective of the patent owner, this produces a of royalty gap, as 
opposed to a royalty stack.  
																																								 																				
 214. In a famous dissent, Justice Scalia enumerated a long list of examples of circumstantial 
“leverage” due to specific investments unworthy of antitrust policy consideration: 
[T]he leverage held by an airplane manufacturer over an airline that has 
“standardized” its fleet around the manufacturer's models; or the leverage held by 
a drill press manufacturer whose customers have built their production lines 
around the manufacturer's particular style of drill press; the leverage held by an 
insurance company over its independent sales force that has invested in company 
specific paraphernalia.  
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 497-98 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 215. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 1, at 1993. 
 216. Id. 
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Let us now turn to systemic patent trespass. Shapiro and Lemley 
again consider that the dynamic effect of patent holdup and royalty 
stacking is to exact a “tax on new products incorporating the patented 
technology, thereby impeding rather than promoting innovation.”217 
Systemic patent holdup primarily implies a decrease in static efficiency 
through reductions in consumer surplus and a disincentive for 
complementary innovators that could reduce dynamic efficiency. A 
market experiencing systemic patent holdup would be characterized by 
low entry rates of new actors, increase in product prices over time, 
slowing market growth, and eventually total market failure as 
implementing firms exit the market. 
Transposed in a trespass scenario, a systemic effect can be 
envisioned as a tax on new R&D and patents that decreases the 
incentives of patent owners to invest into future technologies that may 
become relevant to standards or to participate and contribute 
technology to SSOs.218 In other words, the systemic effect of patent 
trespass can be seen as the opportunity costs for the innovator not yet 
committed to the project.219 Systemic patent holdup would therefore 
result in a decrease in dynamic economic efficiency. In the context of 
SEPs, this would manifest itself in a reduction in performance or delay 
in the development of new standards, possibly through the reduction of 
R&D spending by technology firms in general and the exit from 
consensus-based standard-setting processes in particular. A market 
experiencing systemic patent trespass would therefore be characterized 
by a reduction in technology contributions to consensus-based SSOs, 
increased development of de facto standards, vertical integration or 
acquisitions of SEP holding firms. Other possible effects include 
impact on business models. Startups developing innovative ideas may 
shift from patent licensing as a means to appropriate their innovation, 
towards more capital-intensive methods like firmware development 
and processors manufacturing. Firms that once acquired portfolios of 
patents, including SEPs, may leave the buying market. And companies 
with large SEP patent and SEP positions may be incentivized to 
delegate their licensing activities to privateers.220 As the main effect of 
systemic patent trespass is related to the performance and timing of 
future standards, its impact is counterfactual and thus more difficult to 
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 218. This includes not only the amount of investment in R&D, but also in the standard-
setting process. See Justus Baron, Kirti Gupta, & Brandon Roberts, Unpacking 3GPP Standards 
20 (2015) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://bit.do/Baron-Unpacking3GPP (estimating 
over 3.4 million man-hours had been spent on 3GPP meetings between 2005–2014). 
 219. Cohen, supra note 40, at 359. 
 220. Pentheroudakis & Baron, supra note 14, at 103. 
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measure compared to the more obvious impact of patent holdup. Table 
2 below provides a symmetrical contrast between patent holdup and 
trespass from a circumstantial, systematic, and systemic perspective. 
 
Table 2: Patent Holdup vs. Patent Trespass 
 
As the concepts of market power and abuse of dominant position 
come from a traditional industrial economic perspective associated 
with “antitrust,” it might be beneficial to forego the use of terms 
manifested in the traditional industrial logic of hierarchies and markets, 
such as “holdup/out” and “patent holdup/out,” for a more fundamental 
discussion on the competitive effects of an asymmetric bargaining 
position.221 This is especially important as the institutional starting 
point is not a traditional vertical or horizontal relationship on a market 
for physical products, but instead a collaborative, open standard-setting 
arena based on licensing on a technology market.222 In an open 
innovation environment, such as an SSO, the theoretical pro-
competitive advantages must not only be compared to the theoretical 
anti-competitive disadvantages, but must be empirically investigated to 
determine the actual impact on the welfare of society. In turn any policy 
recommendation that changes the institutional norms of SSOs must be 
judged considering the net economic impact on society. Figure 2 below 
provides a spectrum upon which to measure the impact of asymmetric 
bargaining power in the context of technology markets, in particular 
standards-enabled markets developed collectively through consensus-
based SSOs involving SEPs and FRAND governance. The spectrum 
can be used to measure the current degree of asymmetric bargaining 
																																								 																				
 221. For example, the historical concepts of holdup and holdout, which carry specific 
meanings in mainstream economic theory discussed above, may no longer apply in the current 
reality of open, collaborative innovation and thus may only serve to obfuscate the more 
fundamental issues at hand. 
 222. For a deeper description of the meaning of the material and intellectual value chain in 
the context of SEPs and telecommunications, see Bowman Heiden & Jens Andreasson, 
Reevaluating Patent Damages in the Knowledge Economy: The Intellectual Value Chain and the 
Royalty Base for Standard-Essential Patents, 1 CRITERION J. INNOVATION 229 (2016).  
 Circumstantial Systematic Systemic 
Patent 
Holdup 
Circumstantial 
decrease in SEP 
implementer surplus 
Royalty stack 
Deadweight loss 
(exit of SEP 
implementers) 
Patent 
Trespass 
Circumstantial 
decrease in SEP 
holder surplus 
Royalty gap 
Deadweight loss 
(exit of SEP 
developers) 
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power as well as provide a model to theoretically evaluate the impact 
of proposed policy changes. 
 
Figure 2: Asymmetric Bargaining Power Spectrum  
B. Plus Factors Facilitating Patent Trespass 
Our interviews point to several important plus factors that can 
transform circumstantial patent trespass into systematic and systemic 
issues. First, the relative size, resources and reputation of patent 
owners and implementers seem to be determinant. On the one hand, the 
risk of systematic trespass is more acute when patent implementers are 
SMEs due to lower product sales that lead to unfavorable litigation 
costs-licensing benefits perspectives. Conversely, when patent 
implementers are mostly MNCs, trespass seems less systematic due to 
their higher sales volumes and operations in product markets with 
relatively well-functioning patent systems, such as in the U.S., Europe, 
and Japan. However, concentration of sales in the hands of MNCs can 
facilitate a systematic effect through the actions of only a small group 
of market leaders. For example, in smartphones, five MNCs control 
approximately 60% of the market.223 
On the other hand, the risk of systematic trespass is aggravated 
when the SEP owner has a small SEP portfolio, is a non-vertically-
integrated player that does not need a cross-license, or is a newcomer 
in a standard (no previous patent positions) or in the industry (no 
litigation track record) as the transaction costs of negotiation and 
litigation serve as effective barriers. 
Second, our interviews suggest a systematic patent trespass effect 
can be deemed to occur when 30% or more of a relevant market is 
unlicensed. In this context, patent trespass is likely to be problematic 
in markets where there is a “long tail” of small infringing implementers 
who individually represent low licensing revenue but jointly account 
																																								 																				
 223. IDC, Global Market Share Held by Leading Smartphone Vendors from 4th Quarter 
2009 to 4th Quarter 2016, STATISTA (2017), http://bit.do/Statista-GlobalMarketShare.  
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for large revenues, which has become a large and growing segment 
especially in emerging and developing countries.224 
Third, markets which exhibit a long tail of unlicensed 
implementers may be the by-product of collective action problems: 
why take a license if your competitors do not? SMEs that infringe SEPs 
will trespass for as long as possible and hope that another infringer is 
brought to justice by the SEP owner. When taking licenses SEP 
implementers will often ask for assurances that their competitors are or 
will also be licensed. When this assurance is not met, our interviews 
suggest that firms will respond to this position of license imbalance 
through underreporting and other means to reduce their relative license 
burden in relation to their competitors. When markets are competitive, 
additional costs in the form of SEP license fees can easily have an 
impact on profits and market share that can challenge the viability of 
the firm. 
Fourth, the likelihood of patent trespass is influenced by the 
clarity, predictability and stability of the legal framework in relation to 
patent enforcement. For example, respondents tend to suggest that legal 
frameworks that mandate “structure” in licensing negotiations (like 
Huawei v. ZTE) tend to reduce systematic trespass. However, the 
impact of the weakening of injunctive relief in developed countries and 
difficulties related to enforcement of legal remedies in developing 
countries is said to be a key driver incentivizing delay and non-
compliance in finalizing SEP licenses, respectively. 
Fifth, the systemic effect of patent trespass is primarily 
experienced through the impact on the technology market through the 
development and performance of consensus-based standards.225 As the 
goal of SEPs is to incentivize firms to conduct R&D and contribute to 
standards so as to increase innovation and dynamic efficiency in the 
market, a systemic effect would be characterized by a reduction in the 
																																								 																				
 224. Licensing at the component where there are fewer global actors could reduce the long 
tail problem in theory, however, there are several challenges including: (1) SEPs are often claimed 
on the system/product level not the component level, and (2) patent exposure to downsteam firms 
due to upstream exhaustion of rights. See Heiden & Andreasson, supra note 222, at 261. And (3) 
norms for pricing of licenses at the component level that may lay down a hidden revenue-cap on 
standardized technologies. See Axel Gautier & Nicolas Petit, Smallest Salable Patent Practicing 
Unit and Component Licensing: Why 1$ is Not 1$ 1 (Apr. 18, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://bit.do/Gautier-SmallestSalablePatent. 
 225.  Technology markets in the context of open, consensus-based standards could be 
characterized as having two distinct phases—(1) the competitive development of the technical 
standard in the SSO and (2) the pricing and negotiation of licenses for the use of the technology. 
The fact that these occur separated in time creates the illusion that standardization is based only 
on ex post licensing instead of ex ante technology transfer process. This separation of phases can 
have socially-desirable outcomes through facilitating market development and reducing antitrust 
concerns within the SSO environment. 
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performance trajectory and market traction of subsequent versions of 
standards or the breakdown of consensus-based SSOs (i.e., a 
breakdown of the technology market).226 Indicators of a systemic effect 
on SEP holders and the technology market for standards could be 
observed from several perspectives. For example, traditional SEP 
holding firms would likely reduce their contributions to consensus-
based SSOs (e.g., lower level of essentiality declarations, lower 
attendance rates at technical committee meetings) or potentially 
withdraw completely (e.g., non-renewal of membership, increased 
participation to industry consortia). This may in turn lead to the 
development of competing de facto standards that reduces the pro-
competitive benefits of consensus-based standards. Additionally, SEP 
holders may renege on trying to have their patents recognized as 
essential within SSOs. Finally, SEP holders may reduce their R&D 
investments in technology or be forced into vertical integration through 
mergers, etc. as systemic patent holdup would severely reduce the 
formation of a division of innovative labor.227 
Concomitantly, the behavior of SEP implementers that would 
produce a systemic effect would be witnessed, not only potentially 
through widespread delay or non-payment on the market, but through 
the active lobbying for changes in rules affecting FRAND and the 
pricing of SEPs. As major changes to the “rules of the game” are 
systematic by nature, actions taken by SEP implementers that could be 
predictive of systemic patent trespass would include the successful 
lobbying for changes in patent damages legislation, policy reform by 
competition authorities, and IPR policies in SSOs.  
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF PATENT TRESPASS 
This section reports the results of an empirical study of patent 
trespass, based on the intuitions that arise from received theory and 
qualitative interviews as exposed in the previous sections. Given that 
the information required to understand patent trespass is held within 
private firms, we have conducted confidential surveys with 20 
licensing executives from firms with significant SEP portfolios. The 
common thread to all those firms is that they have actively licensed 
their SEP portfolios with the goal of revenue generation. Our sample 
thus includes SEP developers, SEP implementers (i.e., sell standard-
																																								 																				
 226. This is synonymous with the breakdown of SEP-based product markets predicted in 
patent holdup theory. 
 227. See Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights, Input Markets, and the Value of 
Intangible Assets (Feb. 9, 1999) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://bit.do/Merges-
IPRights (discussing the role of a strong patent system in creating a division of innovative labor).  
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enabled products) as well as non-implementing firms, such as patent 
pools.228 The 12 respondents (60%) that have taken the survey total 206 
years of SEP licensing experience and represent firms with an 
estimated amount of $11,523M in SEP licensing revenue per year and 
$124,590M in SEP-enabled product revenue per year. The 
respondents’ experience was essentially in cellular standards, but also 
in Wi-Fi and video codec standards with one respondent’s expertise 
primarily in the latter. Table 3 provides a statistical summary of the 
respondents to the survey. 
 
Table 3: Summary of Survey Respondents 
Respondents Total Mean S.D. 
SEP Holding Firms 
(total) 
12 – – 
SEP Licensing Revenue 
(n = 11) 
11,523 M/yr $1,048 M/yr 2,241 M/yr 
SEP Implementers 
Firms 
8 – – 
SEP-Enabled Product 
Revenue 
$124,590 M/yr $15574 M/yr 21,771 M/yr 
Non-SEP Implementing 
Firms 
4 – – 
Cellular Standards 10 – – 
H.26x, 802.11x 
Standards 
6 – – 
SEP Licensing 
Experience 
206 yrs 17 yrs 8 yrs 
Note: n = 12. 
 
In the following sections, we display and discuss the results of our 
survey in relation to the nature of patent trespass (A), the size and 
impact of patent trespass (B), the strategic business implications of 
patent trespass (C) and the influence of policy events and future policy 
developments (D). 
																																								 																				
 228. The sample of firms was chosen from the smartphone dataset used in Alexander 
Galetovic, Stephen Haber, & Lew Zaretzki, A New Dataset on Mobile Phone Patent License 
Royalties (Stan. Univ. Hoover Inst. Working Grp. on Intell. Prop., Innovation, & Prosperity, 
Working Paper No. 16011, 2016), and top SEP holding firms from Baron et al., supra note 218, 
at 27 (focusing on firms with a specific business focus to generate revenue from their SEP 
portfolios). 
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A. The Nature of Patent Trespass 
1. Plus Factors Facilitating Patent Trespass 
Table 4 shows how the survey respondents experienced the 
influence of three key factors—identified in received theory and 
qualitative interviews—as facilitating patent trespass. These findings 
confirm the intuitions that patent trespass is very strongly correlated 
with: (1) weak enforcement through alteration of patent rights and 
remedies, and specifically the limitation of injunctive relief, which 
directly mirrors the theoretical impact of injunctive relief on patent 
holdup; and (2) the growing importance of emerging and developing 
markets in the wireless communications industry and the imperfect and 
uncertain enforcement regimes in these jurisdictions. Note that the 
respondents identified China and India as the two most problematic 
jurisdictions, citing domestic protectionism as a key factor impacting 
enforcement difficulties. 
 
Table 4: Key Factors Facilitating Patent Trespass 
General Patent Trespass Factors Impact  Trend (2011-16) 
Difficulty to obtain injunctive relief 4.8 +1.6 
Cost of reaching agreement 3.1 +1.1 
Licensees in jurisdictions where 
enforcement is difficult 
4.7 +0.8 
Note: n = 11. All values are mean values. Impact Scale: 1 (low impact) to 5 (high 
impact). Trend Scale: -2 (significant decrease) to +2 (significant increase). 
2. Patent Trespass Strategies and the Heterogeneity of 
SEP Implementers 
Table 5 records the results of how survey respondents experienced 
relative delay by categories of SEP implementers and the trend over 
2011-16. These observations support the general proposition that 
patent trespass results in significant delay across all actors with an 
increasing trend since 2011. But the most striking result in Table 5 
consists in showing the bimodal nature (i.e., delay vs. non-payment) of 
patent trespass across SEP implementers. On the one hand, MNCs are 
associated with significant delay but not non-payment. On the other 
hand, large firms in emerging economies (LFEs) are almost entirely 
associated with non-payment. Small to medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) are equally associated with both moderate delay and non-
payment, requiring further investigation to better understand the 
circumstances that define these different experiences.  
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Table 5: Heterogeneity of SEP Implementers and the Impact of Delay 
Type of SEP Implementer Relative Delay Trend (2011-16) 
Multi-National Corporations 
(MNCs) 
3.9 +1.7 
Large Firms in Emerging 
economies (LFEs) 
4.7 +1.3 
Small to Medium-sized 
Enterprises (SMEs) 
3.7 +1.1 
Note: n = 11. All values are mean values. Relative Delay scale: 1 (insignificant delay) 
to 5 (no payment). Trend Scale: -2 (significant decrease) to +2 (significant increase). 
 
In addition to the general experience of delay across SEP 
implementers, the survey also addressed the stylized examples 
presented in Section II.B.2, above. Specifically, this included an 
investigation of the delaying tactics associated with patent trespass in 
relation to negotiation (licensing talks), litigation (before courts or 
antitrust agencies) and advocacy (weakening of SEP holders rights 
before SSOs, regulators and legislatures). Table 6 below summarizes 
the findings across eight identified patent trespass strategies. 
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Table 6: Patent Trespass Strategies 
Patent Trespass Strategies Frequency Trend Type of Implementer 
Ignoring correspondence 3.2 +0.8 LFE/SME 
Unreasonable postponement 
of negotiations 
3.5 +0.9 LFE/MNC 
Counteroffers not in sync 
with industry practice 
4.0 +1.6 MNC 
Focusing on individual 
patents instead of SEP 
portfolios 
3.8 +1.2 MNC 
Focusing on specific 
jurisdictions instead of 
worldwide markets 
3.4 +1.2 LFE/MNC 
Refusal to engage a 3rd-
party to set the FRAND rate 
(e.g., through arbitration) 
2.9 +0.4 MNC 
Engaging 
antitrust/competition 
authorities 
2.7 +1.1 LFE/MNC 
Actively working to alter 
SSO IPR policies 
3.2 +1.6 MNC 
Note: n = 10. All values are mean values. Frequency scale: 1 (rarely) to 3 (often) to 5 
(always). Trend Scale: -2 (significant decrease) to +2 (significant increase). Type of 
Implementer: MNC = Multi-National Corporation, LFE = Large Firm in Emerging 
market, SME = Small to Medium-sized Enterprise. 
 
One implication of Table 6 above is that all the patent trespass 
strategies mentioned are significant and increasing in frequency with 
each strategy experienced as occurring between often to very often on 
average, with the exception of the engagement of antitrust/competition 
authorities. In the fourth column, we document the type of actor most 
associated with the specific patent trespass strategy. This column 
confirms the intuitions that (1) SEP implementers deploy 
heterogeneous strategies; (2) LFEs and SMEs are more likely to pursue 
non-payment strategies;229 and (3) MNCs and LFEs are more likely to 
engage in advocacy initiatives, such as engaging competition 
																																								 																				
 229. One example of an LFE benefiting from a patent trespass position in this context is the 
case of HTC, which grew quickly in emerging markets but struggled to enter Western markets 
based on a lack of preparedness to manage patent obligations. See Lanhua Li, Can Huang, & Suli 
Zheng, HTC Case Study, Presentation at the Board Meeting of Institute for Intellectual Property 
Management at School of Management, Zhejiang University (Apr. 29, 2016) (on file with 
authors).  
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authorities and influencing SSO IPR policies based on their size and 
resources. 
The survey respondents identified several additional patent 
trespass strategies related to emerging/developing markets that would 
require further investigation to validate, including: 
• Cartelization amongst SEP implementers reinforcing the 
collective action problem; 
• Corruption at the private-public interface; and 
• Splitting-up of SEP implementers into multiple 
subsidiaries in different countries that require separate 
legal action. 
B. The Size and Impact of Patent Trespass on SEP Holders 
The goal of this section is to better understand the circumstantial 
versus systematic impacts of patent trespass. Our survey asked SEP 
holders to (1) quantify their SEP licensing coverage worldwide over 
time and provide explanations for the possible evolution; and (2) 
quantify several key costs, time, and revenue parameters that impact 
the patent trespass decision-making process for SEP implementers. 
1. SEP Licensing Coverage 
Table 7 shows longitudinal data of licensing coverage as a 
percentage of implementing firms that are potential licensees. While 
global wireless communications markets are growing, the data suggest 
that license coverage has fallen steadily over the past ten years.230 
 
Table 7: SEP Licensing Coverage 
Licensing Coverage 2016 2011 2006 
Percentage of Implementing Firms 39% 59% 73% 
Note: n=7. All values are mean values. 
 
Using the example of the mobile phone market, one key reason 
stated by respondents is the fragmentation of the market into many 
smaller vendors, especially in emerging countries, due to the 
proliferation of the Android operating system for mobile and of 
																																								 																				
 230. The current impact is attenuated by the fact that the majority of handsets are sold by a 
minority of MNCs and the overall market has been growing significantly. Thus, it is possible for 
overall SEP licensing revenues to increase while coverage is decreasing in the short run. 
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standardized hardware. Figure 3 below shows the 340% growth in unit 
sales of microvendors from 2011-15. 
	  
Figure 3: Microvendor Mobile Phone Sales 2011-15 (courtesy of Strategy 
Analytics 2016) 
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Figure 4 represents the worldwide market share of approximately 
150 smartphone vendors in 2015. While the top five multi-national 
vendors still cover 56% of the market, there is growing segment of 
large firms operating in emerging markets (LFEs) such as Oppo, Vivo, 
Micromax, Intex, etc. competing for market share. Moreover, there is 
a growing “long tail” of over 100 microvendors that now accounts for 
13% of global sales. If LFEs and SMEs are more likely to follow a non-
payment strategy as indicated in Section IV.A.2, above, it stands to 
reason that as the volume of sales grows in emerging and developing 
countries, so will the royalty gap as licensing coverage decreases.  
2. Patent Trespass Decision Model Parameters 
Several of the plus factors that affect the patent trespass decision 
model presented in Figure 4 above were analyzed in more detail 
through industry surveys and follow-up interviews, including the 
reasonable length of the due diligence phase (period 0-1), the 
experienced time delay or time to license (period 1-2), the cost of 
reaching an SEP license including litigation, and the impact of delay 
and non-payment on cumulative FRAND royalties (i.e., the royalty 
gap). 
	  
Figure 4: Smartphone Market Share by Vendor, Worldwide in 2015 (courtesy of 
Strategy Analytics 2016) 
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Table 8: Parameters Impacting the Patent Trespass Decision Model 
Decision Model Parameters Mean Range 
Due Diligence Phase  12 months 3–24 months 
Time to License  32 months 18–60+ months 
Cost of SEP Licensing: (n = 4)   
     USA (Negotiation/Litigation)  0.3 $17.5M 0.1–0.5 $5–50M 
     EU (Negotiation/Litigation)  0.15 $6M 0.05–0.25 $2–10M 
     China (Negotiation/Litigation) 0.15 $3M 0.1–0.2 $1–5M 
Impact of Delay (Reduction in 
SEP licensing rates due to 
delay) 
44% 0–80% 
Impact of Non-payment 
(Amount of licensing revenue 
unable to collect) 
39% 0–80% 
Note: n = 10.  
 
Table 8 shows that SEP licensors agree that a reasonable time (see 
period 0-1) in Figure 1) for due diligence is necessary to evaluate the 
SEP portfolio to be licensed. However, the experienced time to license 
is much greater than a reasonable due diligence period for technology 
implementers who have indicated a willingness to license. For those 
who have not shown willingness, the time to license can be even greater 
(sometimes more than half of the lifetime of the standard in the 
market), especially in emerging jurisdictions. Thus our survey results 
tend to confirm the intuition in section IIB that, absent injunctive relief, 
SEP implementers benefit from delaying the finalization of SEP 
licensing agreements. As SEP implementers would seem to be 
rationally incentivized to delay (i.e., there is no benefit to accept an 
early offer). In turn, this could create the potential for a systematic 
impact on FRAND royalties for SEP licensors as indicated by the 
respondents through their experienced reduction in licensing revenue 
from delay (44%) and non-payment (39%) as shown in Table 8.231 
3. Strategic Implications of Patent Trespass 
This section reports the data collected on the systemic impact of 
patent trespass (reduction in economic efficiency). In our survey, SEP 
holders were asked to provide information on strategic trends at firm 
																																								 																				
 231. The focus of the survey was on the impact of licensing revenue, but the impact of lower 
royalties on market share can be very substantial when SEP holders compete with non-licensed 
SEP implementers. 
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level, including quantitative data such as the change in R&D spending 
and technical contributions toward SSOs. The survey also sought to 
collect information on industry level strategic trends, such as the 
change in standardization behavior and market structure in the 
telecommunication value chain.  
 
Table 9: Strategic Trends in the Telecommunication Industry at the Firm and 
Industry Level 
Strategic Trends Mean S.D. 
R&D spending on technology standards -0.5 1.5 
Number of technical contributions to standards -0.4 1.6 
Migration of consensus standards to proprietary de facto 
standards 
+0.8 0.9 
Vertical integration of SEP holders -0.2 1.3 
Note: n = 11. 
 
Table 9 indicates a general movement in the direction associated 
with a potential impact on economic efficiency, in particular, a 
potential reduction in innovative output linked to dynamic efficiency. 
Measures of standard deviations (SD) were included to stress the rather 
broad distribution among the respondents, suggesting that other 
mitigating factors exist. Certainly, further detailed longitudinal 
research regarding R&D spending, frequency of technical 
contributions to SSOs, M&A activity, and the development of de facto 
versus consensus standards would provide greater insight into the 
systemic impact of patent trespass in the wireless communications 
market.232  
4. Policy-Level Events and Recommendations 
This section discusses the impact of specific SEP decisions by 
courts, competition authorities, and standard setting organizations 
(SSOs), which we group together as policy-level events, on patent 
trespass. Our survey asked SEP holders to quantify the general impact 
of specific policy level events on the SEP royalty rate and time-to-
license. 
 
 
																																								 																				
 232. Currently, only one specific case regarding the change in IEEE IPR policy offers a 
glimpse into firm-level, strategic implications. While several large SEP holders have refused to 
agree to the new policy terms, it still remains to be seen whether this will have a systemic impact 
on firm behavior and market structure. 
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Table 10: Impact of SEP Policy-Level Events 
SEP Policy Events Royalty Level Time to License 
eBay v. MercExchange 
(2006) 
-0.7 +1.0 
Orange Book Standard 
(2009) 
+0.2 +0.0 
FTC/Google Settlement 
(2013) 
0.0 +0.1 
Microsoft v. Motorola 
(2013) 
-1.3 +0.9 
IEEE IPR Policy (2015) -1.1 +1.0 
Huawei v. ZTE (2015) +0.3 -0.2 
Average Relative Impact -0.4 +0.5 
Note: n = 10. All values are mean values. 
 
Table 10 shows that the six policy-level events are as a whole 
perceived as creating a negative aggregate impact on SEP royalty rates 
and time-to-license (i.e., a decrease in royalties and increase in delay). 
These results are not unexpected both given the profile of the 
respondents and the general consensus on the expected outcome of 
these events.  
What is more interesting in Table 10 is, however, the relative 
impact perceived by the respondents across the different events. The 
key findings in this regard are (1) the ranking of the Microsoft decision, 
the IEEE IPR Policy, and the eBay decision as creating the greatest 
aggravating impact on patent trespass; and (2) the agreement that the 
Orange Book Standard and Huawei v. ZTE judgments generated a 
positive impact on reducing patent trespass though not through the 
reduction of time-to-license. While these results do not provide 
conclusive evidence on the impact of policy-level events on overall 
royalties and delay in the market, they do indicate that such events in 
the context of standards-enabled markets can produce a systematic 
impact on bargaining positions (in both directions) between SEP 
holders and implementers. Therefore, the systematic impact of patent 
trespass must be viewed across multiple arenas (i.e., court, competition 
authorities, legislatures, and market contexts) and jurisdictions to gain 
a full understanding. This is challenging given the global nature of 
competition and the local nature of IP and competition law. At any rate, 
we can derive from our survey that events that occurred in the E.U. are 
perceived as curtailing patent trespass, while events that took place in 
the U.S. are perceived as facilitating patent trespass. 
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The respondents suggested the need for the following policy 
improvements to reduce patent trespass: 
• Reduced time to adjudication in legal proceedings for 
non-licensed actors to combat the collective action 
problem, especially in emerging and developing 
countries, where actors that take an early, fair license are 
at a competitive disadvantage in relation to those who 
delay; 
• Improved framework for the determination of an 
unwilling licensee and subsequent access to injunctive 
relief to facilitate market transactions; 
• Implement mandatory arbitration for SEP negotiations 
that extend beyond a reasonable point of time; 
• Implement “loser pays” rule in SEP court cases;  
• Allow increased damages beyond FRAND for situations 
where the prospective licensee unreasonably delayed 
negotiations or litigation, or applied extrajudicial pressure 
on license fees;233 
• Allow the court system to manage SEP disputes in well-
functioning markets instead of involving competition 
authorities and standard-setting organizations; 
• Greater education of policy makers in the complexity of 
SEPs and the telecommunication industry; 
• A mechanism for R&D spenders to express a lack of 
balance in the return on R&D investment in business-
model-neutral standards; 
• Facilitate global portfolio licensing between SEP 
licensors and multi-national implementing firms; and 
• Recognize FRAND determinations across jurisdictions. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has investigated the concept of “patent trespass” from 
a theoretical and empirical perspective. Generally, our analysis calls 
for balance to the “standard narrative” of patent holdup and royalty 
stacking. Specifically, our study has made the following findings: 
• The improper concept of “patent holdout” should be 
replaced with another concept that conforms with 
																																								 																				
 233. See Gregory Sidak, Enhanced Damages for Infringement of Standard-Essential 
Patents, 1 CRITERION J. ON INNOVATION 1101 (2016). See also Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. 
v. LG Elecs., Inc., Nos. 2:14-cv-00911, 2:14-cv-00912, 2016 WL 4596118 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 
2016). 
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mainstream economic theory. We have proposed “patent 
trespass,” but we concede that other concepts may be 
more appropriate; 
• The concept of patent holdup used in the early patent 
economics literature is misguiding, and creates a semantic 
trap; 
• The theoretical analysis of “patent holdup” proposed in 
the early patent economics literature is incompatible with 
the conventional understanding of holdup theory in 
transaction cost economics; 
• The patent holdup narrative is incomplete, and needs to 
be supplemented by a “patent trespass” concept. In this 
paper, we advance some basic features of patent trespass 
in the hope of building a fuller, more comprehensive 
theory. We stress the importance of “patent trespass” plus 
factors and strategies based on expert interviews and 
received theory, including a Patent Trespass Decision 
Model and an Asymmetric Bargaining Power Spectrum.  
• Our industry survey provides tolerably strong empirical 
backing to the theoretical proposition of “patent trespass.” 
Admittedly, our industry survey is based on a restricted 
population of respondents who are mostly based on the 
SEP holders’ side. Yet, we submit that this does not affect 
the existence of patent trespass at any level of magnitude. 
An analogy helps here: students of discrimination conduct 
surveys with minorities. Yet no one ever claims that their 
results are defective due to the restriction of their 
population to the primary targets of discrimination. We 
note moreover that the survey was anonymous and that 
the data submitted by the respondents was uncoordinated.  
The main conclusion of the study is that patent trespass is a 
significant phenomenon, which deserves as much attention from courts 
and policy-makers as the patent holdup narrative. Our study 
recommends moving towards a new holistic framework in policy 
making, one that grasps the asymmetric bargaining power that may 
exists between SEP holders and implementers.  
The preliminary empirical results show a correlational 
relationship between the nature of patent trespass and the heterogeneity 
of market actors and markets. In particular, MNCs operating in 
developed markets were said to primarily deploy extensive delaying 
tactics with the main goal of reducing their royalty payments, while 
large firms in emerging markets (LFE) and small to medium-sized 
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enterprises (SMEs), especially the “long tail” of microvendors, seek to 
avoid payment altogether. The latter issue is reinforced by an apparent 
collective action problem among competitors in combination with the 
growth of emerging markets. To illustrate this point, a patent trespass 
decision model is developed to explain why it is rational for SEP 
implementers to delay or avoid payment given the lack of access to 
injunctive relief and the transaction costs and uncertainty of 
enforcement across different jurisdictions.  
While the patent holdup narrative has been the driver of several 
competition policy initiatives in the past decade, it is less obvious 
whether patent trespass has received consideration from competition 
authorities. If our preliminary finding is right that patent trespass can 
generate adverse effects on economic efficiency, this calls into 
question whether competition policy resources are deployed towards 
the right market failure. To be more concrete, should competition 
policy remedies also be deployed towards anti-competitive behavior by 
SEP implementers that could have a systemic impact on economic 
efficiency, in particular, dynamic efficiency? This could manifest itself 
through collusion to change IPR policies in SSOs to reduce SEP 
payments or through cartelization of actors in emerging markets to 
avoid SEP payments.  
Of course, our study identifies several firm and industry level 
factors that suggest that patent trespass yields adverse effects on 
economic efficiency. Yet, our preliminary evidence does not produce 
entirely conclusive results, which lead us to the following final point. 
As patent holdup and trespass theory predict opposite results and 
implications, empirical evidence is required to assess the impact of 
actual bargaining positions on the standards-enabled market so as to 
effectively advise policy. Several empirical studies have attempted to 
calculate the aggregate royalties in standards-enabled products (i.e., the 
royalty stack).234 This study adds to the discourse but more importantly 
urges academics and policy-makers to engage in further empirical 
studies to support better theory development and evidence-based 
decision-making. 235 
																																								 																				
 234. Galetovic et al., supra note 228, at 2; Gregory Sidak, What Aggregate Royalty Do 
Manufacturers of Mobile Phones Pay to License Standard-Essential Patents?, 1 CRITERION J. ON 
INNOVATION 701, 701-02 (2015); Keith Mallinson, Cumulative Mobile-SEP Royalty Payments 
No More than Around 5 percent of Mobile Handset Revenues, IP FINANCE (Aug. 19, 2015), 
http://bit.do/Mallinson-Cumulative-Mobile; Keith Mallinson, “Patent Holdup” Allegations 
Encourage SEP Free-Riders, IP FINANCE (Aug. 16, 2016), http://bit.do/Mallinson-on-Patent-
Holdup. 
 235. For example, further research would be needed to better understand the nature and 
problem of different classes of trespasses, especially in relation to the context of patents, should 
the use of patent trespass move from merely an explanatory analogy to a normative concept. 
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APPENDIX A 
A. Industry Survey 
1. Respondent (if retired or have worked in multiple firms, 
please choose the firm that best represents your 
experience with SEP licensing) – F1b 
a. Is your firm an SEP holder? 
• Yes (Approximately how big is your licensing 
revenue?) 
• No 
b. Is your firm an SEP implementer?  
• Yes (Approximately how big is your product 
revenue?) 
• No 
c. Which standard represents the majority of your SEP 
license revenue? 
2. The Nature of Patent Holdout – what, who, why? – D1-5, 
F1a, 
1. How would you define patent holdout? (Open 
answer) D1-5 
2. To what extent do you experience patent holdout with 
the following implementers?: (F1a) 
• MNCs operating in both developed and 
developing/emerging economies (e.g., Samsung, 
Apple, Lenovo/Motorola, etc.) 
o Relative Delay in Payment (1-5) 
1=insignificant, 5=no payment 
o Trend (-2,+2) -2=large decrease, +2=large 
increase 
• Large firms operating primarily in 
developing/emerging economies (e.g., 
MicroMax, Oppo, Vivo, etc.) 
o Relative Delay in Payment (1-5) 
1=insignificant, 5=no payment 
o Trend (-2,+2) -2=large decrease, +2=large 
increase 
																																								 																				
Additionally, further exploration of the traditional law of equitable remedies for tested approaches 
to double-sided-opportunism problems arising from simple structures of rights could provide 
further insights into potential solutions that more effectively balance the interests of SEP holders 
and implementers in standards-enabled markets. 
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• SMEs operating primarily in 
developing/emerging economies (e.g., 
microvendors with less than 10M units/year) 
o Relative Delay in Payment (1-5) 
1=insignificant, 5=no payment 
o Trend (-2,+2) -2=large decrease, +2=large 
increase 
• Other 
o Relative Delay in Payment (1-5) 
1=insignificant, 5=no payment 
o Trend (-2,+2) -2=large decrease, +2=large 
increase 
3. What are the key factors facilitating patent holdout?  
• Difficulty to obtain injunctive relief? (D4, F4) 
o Impact (1-5) 5=highest impact 
o Trend (-2,+2) -2=large decrease, +2=large 
increase 
• Transaction cost of reaching agreement with 
licensees? (D2) 
o Impact (1-5) 5=highest impact 
o Trend (-2,+2) -2=large decrease, +2=large 
increase 
o What are the average costs associated with 
finalizing an SEP licensing deal: 
§ US/Europe 
§ India/China 
• Licensees in jurisdictions where enforcement is 
difficult and legal remedies regarding patent 
damages is uncertain? (F4b)  
o Impact (1-5) 5=highest impact 
o Trend (-2,+2) -2=large decrease, +2=large 
increase 
o Which are the top three most problematic 
jurisdictions from a patent holdout 
perspective? 
• Licensees require that competitors are licensed 
before willing to take license (F3d) 
o Impact (1-5) 5=highest impact 
o Trend (-2,+2) -2=large decrease, +2=large 
increase 
• Other?  
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o Impact (1-5) 5=highest impact 
o Trend (-2,+2) -2=large decrease, +2=large 
increase 
4. How often do you experience the following 
implementer holdout conduct? (SE1-4)  
• Ignoring correspondence 
o Frequency (1-5) 5=always 
o Trend (-2,+2) -2=large decrease, +2=large 
increase 
• Unreasonable postponement of negotiations 
o Frequency (1-5) 5=always 
o Trend (-2,+2) -2=large decrease, +2=large 
increase 
• Counter offers not in sync with industry practice 
o Frequency (1-5) 5=always 
o Trend (-2,+2) -2=large decrease, +2=large 
increase 
• Focusing on individual patents instead of SEP 
portfolio 
o Frequency (1-5) 5=always 
o Trend (-2,+2) -2=large decrease, +2=large 
increase 
• Focusing on specific jurisdictions instead of 
worldwide license 
o Frequency (1-5) 5=always 
o Trend (-2,+2) -2=large decrease, +2=large 
increase 
• Antitrust complaint threat 
o Frequency (1-5) 5=always 
o Trend (-2,+2) -2=large decrease, +2=large 
increase 
• SSO complaint threat 
o Frequency (1-5) 5=always 
o Trend (-2,+2) -2=large decrease, +2=large 
increase 
• Other (open answer) 
o Frequency (1-5) 5=always 
o Trend (-2,+2) -2=large decrease, +2=large 
increase 
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3. Size and Impact of Patent Holdout 
a. What percentage of the product market do you 
contact/attempt to license? 
• % of firms contacted 
• If not 100%, why? 
b. What percentage of the product market is licensed? 
(F2a) 
• % of implementing firms (now, -5y, -10y) 
• % of units sold (now, -5y, -10y) 
• % of sales revenue (now, -5y, -10y) 
c. What percentage of SEP holders receive licenses? 
• % of firms claiming to hold SEPs that receive 
licenses 
• Why don’t all SEP holders receive licenses? 
d. What is the impact of the unwillingness to license 
• % reduction in final royalty amount 
• % license revenue impossible to collect  
• number of years to finalize license from time of 
first contact,  
e. In your opinion, what is considered a reasonable 
amount of time to complete due diligence and 
negotiations of an SEP portfolio licensing 
agreement? 
f. What is a realistically successful licensing program 
in terms of percentage of licensed market sales 
(relative scale %) 
g. Hypothetically, what is the minimum coverage (in 
terms of percentage of licensed market sales) to 
maintain a viable licensing operation? 
4. Impact of Policy Events  
a. What has been the impact of the following events on 
the ability to finalize an SEP license agreement – 
royalty magnitude and time-to-license? (relative 
scale) 
• eBay v. MercExchange (2006) 
o Royalty level (-2,+2) -2=large decrease, 
+2=large increase 
o Time-to-License (-2,+2) -2=large decrease, 
+2=large increase 
• Orange Book Standard (2009) 
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o Royalty level (-2,+2) -2=large decrease, 
+2=large increase 
o Time-to-License (-2,+2) -2=large decrease, 
+2=large increase 
• FTC/Google Settlement (2013) 
o Royalty level (-2,+2) -2=large decrease, 
+2=large increase 
o Time-to-License (-2,+2) -2=large decrease, 
+2=large increase 
• Microsoft v. Motorola (2013) 
o Royalty level (-2,+2) -2=large decrease, 
+2=large increase 
o Time-to-License (-2,+2) -2=large decrease, 
+2=large increase 
• IEEE IPR Policy (2015) 
o Royalty level (-2,+2) -2=large decrease, 
+2=large increase 
o Time-to-License (-2,+2) -2=large decrease, 
+2=large increase 
• Huawei v. ZTE (2015) 
o Royalty level (-2,+2) -2=large decrease, 
+2=large increase 
o Time-to-License (-2,+2) -2=large decrease, 
+2=large increase 
5. Strategic Implications (F5) 
a. In the past 5 years, please describe the trend in the 
following: 
• Firm level 
o R&D spending on technology standards (-
2,+2) -2=large decrease, +2=large increase 
o Number of technical contributions to 
standards (-2,+2) -2=large decrease, 
+2=large increase 
• Industry Level 
o Migration from consensus standards towards 
proprietary de facto standards (-2,+2) -
2=large decrease, +2=large increase 
o Vertical integration of SEP holders in the 
industry (-2,+2) -2=large decrease, +2=large 
increase 
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6. Policy Recommendations 
What policy changes would you recommend to combat patent 
holdout? 
